Key takeaways: - TeamTNT is using new, open source tools to steal usernames and passwords from infected machines. The campaign has been active for approximately one month and is responsible for thousands of infections globally. Background . TeamTNT has been one of the most active threat groups since mid 2020. One of the most recent findings (June 4, 2021) came from Palo Alto researchers who discovered the TeamTNT Chimaera repository. TeamTNT C&C website showing infection statistics . Figure 2. The full list of supported programs can be found on the Lazagne page on Github. Windows module - persistence . Kubernetes root payload component . This component is mainly responsible for installing a cryptocurrency miner on infected devices, allowing the attacker to connect remotely to the system using SSH. Decoded shell script . TeamTNT IRC bot . As described previously this year by Lacework, TeamTNT includes ZiggyStartux in their IRC bot. IRC Bot available commands . TeamTNT AWS stealer . Similar to the other TeamTNT components, the AWS stealer (see figure 11) first installs missing dependencies. Conclusion . AT&T Alien Labs has discovered new malicious files distributed by the threat actor TeamTNT


As mentioned by the Cisco Talos Intelligence Group, after executing the Micropsia registers itself against the C2 server


The binary uses a file system watcher in order to generate an event each time a file is modified in one of the directories in the "Paths" variable of the configuration file. Filesystem monitoring routine Once a file is available, the Dog.exe binary exfiltrates it, using email or FTP depending on the configuration


At line 40, that data is piped through the base64 utility for decoding, dropped in a subfolder in the /tmp directory, given executable permissions via chmod, and then launched as the 2nd stage payload


Sodinokibi ransomware, also known as REvil or Sodin, has been responsible for a series of high-profile attacks since April 2019


PowerShell scripts that perform system reconnaissance and credential theft from Windows Credential Manager and then send this information back to Waterbug C&Cs


After successfully executing the command, POWRUNER sends the results back to the C2 server and stops execution


Retrieves the following data from the system by leveraging Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) queries and environment variables: IP Address from Network Adapter Configuration OS Name OS Architecture Computer Name Computer Domain Name Username - IP Address from Network Adapter Configuration - OS Name - OS Architecture - Computer Name - Computer Domain Name - Username


Endpoint Protection . The Trojan.Hydraq Incident . It has been about a week since news of the mysterious Hydraq Trojan (also known as Aurora) attack broke with the unveiling of a threat by Google to pull its operations out of China. Although concrete details of the attacks are not yet public, Google made reference to a number of Gmail accounts that were compromised during or after the attacks. In the more sophisticated attacks, the attacker will use a new zero day vulnerability, as obviously this will have a greater success rate. In this attack a PDF file was used to exploit the Adobe Acrobat, Reader, and Flash Player Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2009-1862/BID35759). This PDF installed a Trojan horse which was an earlier version of the current Trojan.Hydraq. Considering the efforts that the attackers put into staging the attack as a whole, the end malware is not so sophisticated. This means the remote attacker has the ability to see in real time any user interface activity as if they were sitting right next to the user. The backchannel URL addresses have been changed by the Dynamic DNS sites to resolve to a loopback address (127.0.0.2). This in effect severs the connection to the control servers. As described in the previously posted blog (Hydraq - An Attack of Mythical Proportions), an unpatched Internet Explorer vulnerability (BID 37815) was used as one of the propagation vectors for this particular Trojan.Hydraq attack. This security hole allows remote exploitation, which means that attackers can run any malicious code of their liking on a victim’s machine by taking advantage of the vulnerability. The use of browsers other than Internet Explorer by an increasingly large number of people may have helped limit the “attack surface” by reducing the number of computers vulnerable to the Internet Explorer vulnerability used in this attack


One of the most noticeable differences is the use of encryption over the entire TCP segment, as a way for it to evade detection. Additionally, this seems to be a lightweight version of Gh0stRAT, as it only has 12 commands, compared to the 73 for a full Gh0stRAT sample; 3 of those commands are undocumented. Also, unlike most samples that I receive on my honeypot, this sample did not start as a DLL that communicates to a distribution server in order to download the stage1


The attackers gain an initial foothold on targeted machines via phishing emails containing malicious attachments. The emails are often industry-specific and crafted to entice a victim to open the message and execute the attached document


The companies believe that the actors acquired legitimate credentials prior to the cyber-attack to facilitate remote access


A loading script, written in Ruby, was saved to the following location and set to run as a Scheduled Task


The name EvilBunny is derived from debug information embedded in the malware’s dropper. Furthermore, the specified piece incorporates a Lua 5.1 interpreter, which allows the malware to execute Lua scripts and change its behavior at runtime. The dropper will place the EvilBunny malware under %APPDATA%\Perf Manager\ or %WINDIR%\msapps\; depending whether the dropper is running with administrative privileges or not. Also, the malware will generate numerous files to help its execution and frequently reply back to the C&C with status messages. Similar to its dropper, the binary seeks to evade sandboxes. Next to that, the main thread also runs sub threads to maintain log files the malware creates during execution and to keep track of the overall system load the malware creates. The worker threads are internally dubbed ‘hearer’, which is believed to stand for ‘listener’. It can be concluded thereafter that the malware authors were no English native speakers. The main action of the malware is carried out in the main thread, which parses commands and executes Lua scripts, provided by the worker threads via command files. Each hearer has a dedicated method to receive instructions which is either separately via HTTP from the server, aggregated through a downloaded data file or as tasks to be configured as scheduled tasks. In general this is a rather uncommon technique, but it has been observed before, especially in connection with some adware variants


The malware continues by creating a service named mssecsvc2.0 with a binary path pointing to the running module with the arguments "-m security". Once created, the malware starts the service


Sends phishing mail to given recipients and receives user’s access token using device code authentication flow


First-stage analysis . When the user opens the phishing email, it presents a Spanish social engineering message ("Payment: Find scheduled payment dates attached"). The figure below shows a screenshot of one of the emails we looked at. It decrypts the URL for the second-stage from hardcoded bytes, saves it to the "Templates" folder, and executes it. Second-stage analysis . The second-stage executable is packed with a Delphi-based packer. The DLL sets a timer, as shown below, which will execute the downloader function periodically. The DLL decodes the hex string using the following steps: We have written a small Python script to decrypt the third stage. The same decryption method was also used to decrypt the hardcoded command and control (C2).The resulting file is also a DLL, which the second stage reflectively loads. Injected DLL analysis (UAC bypass using two techniques) . It checks if `C:\Windows\Finex` exists. Decrypting and executing Lokibot . After attempting to bypass the UAC, the third-stage DLL will check if `AutoRunKeyFlag` is set. For this DLL, it is not set. This dropper uses three stages and three layers of encryption to hide its final payload


Find out all system information, including hardware being used and the exact version of your operating system, including security patches. Steal from your clipboard (things you’ve copied) - Control your printer - Lock/Restart/Shutdown your computer - Update the implant with a new address to beacon to or new functionality


This step establishes the persistence of the malware across reboots on the endpoint - Once the decrypted MZ marker is written to the Startup folder, the 2.hwp is deleted from the endpoint


Interestingly as we continued to expand and pivot in our data set, one of the C2 IPs used by an IRC bot payload from Magic Hound was found to be the same IP used to deliver a different IRC bot called MPK


They include registry, file system manipulations, and searching files with specific patterns, and retrieving and transferring them back to the server and gathering network status information


OopsIE Trojan Analysis The OopsIE Trojan delivered in these attacks is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated with ConfuserEx v1.0.0. The Trojan extracts and loads this embedded assembly by concatenating the contents of two resources named S1 and S2 and decompresses the resulting data using the GZipSteam class. The resulting Interop.SHDocVw .NET assembly is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated using Confuser v1.9.0.0. By using the InternetExplorer application object, all C2 related requests will look as if they came from the legitimate browser and therefore will not contain any anomalous fields within the request, such as custom User-Agents. As seen in the above request, the Trojan will generate a URL for its beacon with the following structure: http://<c2 domain>/chk. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> The Trojan will issue a request to this URL to check (hence the chk string in the URL) to see if the C2 server has a command for the Trojan to run. The C2 server will respond to the Trojan’s request by echoing the value <hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> if it wishes to provide additional commands. If the C2 server does not respond with the appropriate echoed data, the Trojan will create a file named srvCheckresponded.tmp in the SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData folder and write nothing to it before exiting. If the C2 server provides the appropriate echoed data in the response, the Trojan attempts to determine what commands the C2 wishes to run by issuing a request to the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/what. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> After issuing the what command, the Trojan will parse the C2's response for the string Oops, which the Trojan will treat as the C2 making a mistake and will exit


The encrypted file names are appended with a string of random characters as the new extension. For example, it renames a file named “My_files.zip” to “My_files.zip.IAsnM”, “My_files2.zip” to “My_files2.zip.WZlF” and so on. Also, the threat actor creates the “RECOVER-FILES.txt” with ransom note in all folders that contain encrypted files, as shown in the figure below


Task 0x1: react_exec The react_exec command appears to execute a payload received from the server. Interestingly it attempts to first execute the payload directly from memory. Specifically it invokes a function named ei_run_memory_hrd which invokes the Apple NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory, NSLinkModule, NSLookupSymbolInModule, and NSAddressOfSymbol APIs to load and link the in-memory payload. In some cases the file will be set to executable via a call to chmod. Specifically it instructs the malware to spawn a background thread to execute a function named eilf_rglk_watch_routine. This function creates an event tap (via the CGEventTapCreate API), add it to the current runloop, then invokes the CGEventTapEnable to activate the event tap


Its functions include self-starting of the backdoor, collection of network configuration, keystroke records, and schedule other modules to execute by means of timers


Talos has identified at least three different campaigns since July 2019. It is interesting to note that this threat actor uses HTTPS on the C2. They always use self-signed certificates


The malware will then write a base64 encoded PowerShell script (which is contained in xmlparse.dll as a resource) to \%TEMP%\enu1.ps1 and execute it. The script, intended for reconnaissance purposes, checks if a machine is part of a domain and if the user has Admin privileges or is part of the Admin Group


The malicious payload associated with the campaign appears to be a new version of Zeus Panda, a banking trojan designed to stealing banking and other sensitive credentials for exfiltration by attackers. The payload that Talos analyzed was a multi-stage payload, with the initial stage featuring several anti-analysis techniques designed to make analysis more difficult and prolonged execution to avoid detection. It also featured several evasion techniques designed to ensure that the malware would not execute properly in automated analysis environments, or sandboxes. The overall operation of the Zeus Panda banking trojan has been well documented, however Talos wanted to provide additional information about the first stage packer used by the malware. The malware will first query the system's keyboard mapping to determine the language used on the system. It will terminate execution if it detects the any of the following keyboard mappings


Grandoreiro also employs a technique for privilege escalation described in more detail here. The method relies on registering a binary as the default handler for .MSC files and then running such a file


For the purpose of social engineering, the threat actor chose file names related to legitimate online services, including Microsoft OneDrive. In a few instances, we observed the use of file names resembling McAfee’s endpoint security product. Even the file icons for these binaries are selected to masquerade as the corresponding legitimate applications


Additionally, each beacon is accompanied with a screenshot that is initially saved as ‘scr.jpg’ in the public directory and subsequently issued to the C2 using the same HTTP POST request as in the ‘uploadsf’ command


The TajMahal framework is an intriguing discovery that’s of great interest, not least for its high level of technical sophistication, which is beyond any doubt. For example, it has its own indexer, emergency C2s, is capable of stealing specific files from external drives when they become available again, etc


Analysis of the “log.dat” payloads determined them to be variants of the publicly available POSHC2 proxy-aware stager written to download and execute PowerShell payloads from a hardcoded command and control (C2) address. These particular POSHC2 samples run on the .NET framework and dynamically load payloads from Base64 encoded strings


This threat group has conducted broad targeting across a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. Join us in a live webinar as we discuss this threat group whom we assess to be working on behalf of the Iranian Government, with a mission that would benefit nation-state geopolitical and economic needs. APT34 uses a mix of public and non-public tools, often conducting spear phishing operations using compromised accounts from trusted third parties, sometimes coupled with social engineering tactics. Register today to gain deeper insights into this threat group


The ‘tasklist’ command will use a WMI query or the “ps” command, which allows Kazuar to obtain running processes from both Windows and Unix systems. Also, Kazuar’s ‘cmd’ command will run commands using “cmd.exe” for Windows systems and “/bin/bash” for Unix systems. These two commands provide evidence that the authors of Kazuar intended to use this malware as a cross-platform tool to target both Windows and Unix systems


Obviously, the request sent to the C&C is encoded with Base64. The bot subsequently receives its unique ID and uses it for identification at the start of the packet


1) Writes itself to %AppData%\Microsoft\Word\log.ps1 2) Sets up persistence for this file, using a run key. 3) Adds a registry key so that future powershell.exe instances are spawned off-screen by default – this trick is explained here. 6) Removes all registry entries that are left behind during the dropper process


After deobfuscation you can see “Imminent Monitor” string which may indicate it is related to Imminent Monitor RAT


In February 2013, AlienVault performed analysis on the CallMe Trojan and found that it is based on a tool called Tiny SHell, an OSX shell tool whose source code is available on the Internet. The Trojan uses AES to encrypt the communication channel its C2 server, which will provide one of three commands to carry out activities on the compromised system, as seen in Table 4


Aside from the aforementioned executables, the droppers also contained a remote access Trojan (RAT). The RAT executable allows criminals to perform various operations on a host, such as uploading/downloading, executing files, etc


CTU analysis indicates that BRONZE BUTLER primarily targets organizations located in Japan. The threat group has sought unauthorized access to networks of organizations associated with critical infrastructure, heavy industry, manufacturing, and international relations. Secureworks analysts have observed BRONZE BUTLER exfiltrating the following categories of data


The Trojan will attempt to inject code into these browsers to carry out its C2 communications. To carry out C2 communications via injected code in a remote process, the injected code reaches out to the C2 server and saves the response to a memory mapped file named SNFIRNW. Command and Control Communications In addition to being able to communicate with its C2 server from code injected into a web browser, the Trojan can also carry out the same communication process within its own process


All the scripts are deleted immediately after being executed. TeamTNT also uses the “history -c” command to clear the shell log in every script


McAfee Advanced Threat Research (ATR) analysts have discovered an aggressive Bitcoin-stealing phishing campaign by the international cybercrime group Lazarus that uses sophisticated malware with long-term impact


Transparent Tribe has historically used military and defense-themes in their phishing emails and maldocs to target Indian military and government personnel. Figure 6: Transparent Tribe's spear-phishing email targeting defense personnel. This is in line with previous reporting on Transparent Tribe's use of official COVID-19 applications and content to serve Android malware. Figure 7: Attached malicious XLS macro. Another lure targeted Indian Defense Advisors attached to various Indian embassies in Southeast Asia, as seen in Figure 8


Execute a remote shell; - Silently start a program on a victim host; - Retrieve a list of processes from the victim host; - Terminate any process; - Upload/Download/Delete files to/from victim host; - Retrieve a list of available drives from the victim host; - Retrieve a filelist of a specified folder from the victim host


While the ports associated with this sample’s configuration pertain normally to HTTP, HTTPS, or DNS, network communication takes place via raw sockets


If the victim appears valuable to the attackers, a GRIFFON implant installer is pushed to the victim’s workstation. This module stores another instance of the GRIFFON implant inside the registry to achieve persistence. Here is a PowerLinks-style method used by the attackers to achieve persistence and execute the GRIFFON implant at each user logon. The new GRIFFON implant is written to the hard drive before each execution, limiting the “file-less” aspect of this method


This folder is used as a temporary location to copy all files from a newly connected logical drive to and upload them to the C2 server. The files are transferred to the hardcoded C2 server "195.62.52.93" one by one via HTTP POST method. The following request is used which also includes information about the victim, the file to be transferred as well as the source drive


It then modifies several registry key values to disable the IE browser’s functions such as auto-complete, auto-suggest, etc. The disabled keys are: "Use FormSuggest", "FormSuggest Passwords", "FormSuggest PW Ask" under the sub-key “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main”, and "AutoSuggest" under the sub-key "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\AutoComplete


Indeed, any decent firewall would block incoming packets to any ports that have not explicitly been opened for operational purposes. However, with Chaos using a raw socket, the backdoor can be triggered on ports running an existing legitimate service. As an example, a Webserver that would only expose SSH (22), HTTP (80) and HTTPS (443) would not be reachable via a traditional backdoor due to the fact that those services are in use, but with Chaos it becomes possible


The malicious script executed by the Microsoft Publisher file downloads and runs yet another JavaScript file, 0.js, hosted on the attacker-controlled server


The Netsh commands for Windows Firewall provide a command-line alternative to the capabilities of the Windows Firewall Control Panel utility. By using the Netsh firewall commands, you can configure and view Windows Firewall exceptions and configuration settings


Strings in the malware are obfuscated using the RC4 algorithm and the decryption key stored inside the sample


This specific key is set to point towards the path of the previously copied Cardinal RAT executable path. The executable will periodically query this registry key to ensure it is set appropriately. If the executable finds the registry key has been deleted, it will re-set it. The Load registry key acts as a persistence mechanism, ensuring that this Cardinal RAT executes every time a user logs on


Additional tools were recovered during the incident, including a network scanning/enumeration tool, the archiving tool WinRAR and a bespoke Microsoft SharePoint enumeration and data dumping tool, known as ‘spwebmember


Overall the code is very well written and designed to execute quickly to encrypt the defined files in the configuration of the ransomware. The embedded configuration file has some interesting options which we will highlight further in this article


The group has the capability to set up phishing infrastructure to mimic well known websites and trick victims to enter their credentials. This is one of the main methods used by this actor to collect email addresses that later will be used to send spearphishing emails


Use of custom routines to decrypt strings (Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information [T1140]) - Ability to self-delete once installed (Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion [T1070.004]) - Masquerade as GrowlHelper (Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service [T1036.004]) - And as Software Update Check (Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service [T1036.004]) - Decrypt strings in-memory, per CIA guidelines (Obfuscated Files or Information [T1027


With the emergence of the Log4j security vulnerability, we’ve already seen multiple threat actors, mostly financially motivated, immediately add it to their exploitation arsenal. It comes as no surprise that some nation-sponsored actors also saw this new vulnerability as an opportunity to strike before potential targets have identified and patched the affected systems


The attack group has made incremental changes to ZeroT since our last analysis. The encrypted ZeroT payload, named Mctl.mui, is decoded in memory revealing a similarly tampered PE header and only slightly modified code when compared to ZeroT payloads we analyzed previously


Depending on the Ramsay version, file collection won’t be restricted to the local system drive, but also will search additional drives such as network or removable drives


We were able to expand on some of the findings about the group and provide insights into the additional variants that it uses. We were able to trace the implant back to at least 2015, where it also had variants intended to hijack the execution of the Telegram and Chrome applications as a persistence method


During execution, the code employs byte randomization to obscure its behavior. This is achieved by using the host’s current time as a seed for a pseudorandom number generator, and then performing additional operations against that output. The resulting values are used to overwrite blocks of previously executed code. This byte manipulation is the first anti-analysis technique observed in the code, as any attempt to dump the memory segment would result in illegitimate or incorrect operations


The worm deploys the XMRig mining tool to mine monero crypto-currency and generate cash for the attackers. One of the Mining pools they use provides detailed information about the systems the worm has compromised


Avira’s Advanced Threat Research team, has been tracking Mustang Panda APT for a while. According to Avira’s telemetry data, Mustang Panda mostly targets Asia-Pacific (APAC) countries and uses Cobalt or PlugX as payload


It also deletes Windows Event Logs : Application, Security, Setup, System. It is less focused on deleting documents


We have been tracking RDAT since 2017, when we first saw this tool uploaded to a webshell related to the TwoFace webshell discussed in our Striking Oil blog published on September 26, 2017. RDAT has been under active development since 2017, resulting in multiple variations of the tool that rely on both HTTP and DNS tunneling for C2 communications. In June 2018, the developer of RDAT added the ability to use Exchange Web Services (EWS) to send and receive emails for C2 communications. This email-based C2 channel is novel in its design, as it relies on steganography to hide commands and exfiltrates data within BMP images attached to the emails. The combination of using emails with steganographic images to carry the data across the C2 can result in this activity being much more difficult to detect and allow for higher chances of defense evasion


Comnie Malware Family Comnie uses the RC4 algorithm in multiple locations both to obfuscate strings used by the malware, as well as for network communication. More information about how Comnie handles identified security products may be found in the technical analysis in the Appendix. Comnie is able to achieve persistence via a .lnk file that is stored within the victim’s startup path. When originally run, Comnie will convert itself from an executable file to a DLL and will write this newly created DLL to the host machine’s %APPDATA% directory. Unit 42 has observed a total of two variants of Comnie. In older variants, Comnie was found to look for the ‘++a++’ markers. The example C2s used by older variants of Comnie demonstrates this


DropBook’s capabilities include checking installed programs and file names for reconnaissance, executing shell commands received from Facebook or Simplenote, and fetching additional payloads from Dropbox and running them


The malware uploads the stolen data to third-party cloud storage providers. The sample identified in the wild is configured to upload to pCloud, but functionality to upload to Dropbox, Box and Yandex Cloud is also included


Valak C2 traffic returns data as encoded ASCII text that is decoded on the victim host and saved as malware items like script files, EXE used during the infection and data for registry updates for the Valak infection


In addition to the encrypted strings table, BitPaymer replaces the remaining strings in the binary with hashes and uses an algorithm to match these hashes with strings that exist on the host. The hash algorithm has been replicated in Python below


It is notable that we have only seen these exploitation attempts leverage publicly available malware such as Cobalt Strike and Meterpreter. While these backdoors are full featured, in previous incidents APT41 has waited to deploy more advanced malware until they have fully understood where they were and carried out some initial reconnaissance. In 2020, APT41 continues to be one of the most prolific threats that FireEye currently tracks. This new activity from this group shows how resourceful and how quickly they can leverage newly disclosed vulnerabilities to their advantage


In the old campaign the actor used TextBoxes to store its data while in the new one the content has been base64 encoded within the document content. In the new campaign JavaScript files have been used to execute batch and PowerShell files. The new campaign uses Powershell and URLMON API calls to download the cab file while in the old campaign it used certutil to download the cab file. The new campaign has used two different UAC bypass techniques based on the victim’s OS while in the old one the actor only used the Token Impersonation technique. In the new campaign the actor has developed a new variant of Konni RAT that is heavily obfuscated. Also, its configuration is encrypted and is not base64 encoded anymore


The “sysid” parameter contains a campaign ID in newer versions of the malware, the Windows version running on the infected machine, system architecture, username, and a random integer


Two days later, a second email — purportedly a warning from a Pakistani military about the Pegasus spyware — containing a cutt.ly link to a malicious encrypted Word document and the password for decryption will be sent to the target. The sender address impersonates a service similar to that on the first email (alert@ispr.gov.pk


Key points PureCrypter is a fully-featured loader being sold since at least March 2021 The malware has been observed distributing a variety of remote access trojans and information stealers The loader is a .NET executable obfuscated with SmartAssembly and makes use of compression, encryption and obfuscation to evade antivirus softwar


The Gamaredon group has been active since at least 2013. Contrary to other APT groups, the Gamaredon group seems to make no effort in trying to stay under the radar. Typical Gamaredon compromise chain . While most of the recent publications have focused on the spearphishing emails together with the downloaders they contain, this blogpost focuses on the post-compromise tools deployed on these systems. Office macro injection module – CodeBuilder . We analyzed different variants of malicious modules used by the Gamaredon group to inject malicious macros or remote templates into documents already present on the compromised system. It then scans for documents with valid Word or Excel file extensions on all drives connected to the system. The most prevalent tools downloaded and installed on compromised machines can be broadly grouped into two different categories: downloaders and backdoors. Backdoors – file stealers . While some variations exist in functionalities, the main purpose of these modules is to enumerate all documents on a compromised system and upload them to the C&C server. The behavior of this module is quite straightforward: it scans the system for new Microsoft Office documents, both on local and removable drives, and uploads them to the C&C server. Quality of execution . We were able to collect numerous different samples of malicious scripts, executables and documents used by the Gamaredon group throughout their campaigns. Conclusion . Despite the simplicity of most of their tools, the Gamaredon group also is capable of deploying some novelty, such as their Outlook VBA module


Emotet is an advanced, modular banking Trojan that primarily functions as a downloader or dropper of other banking Trojans. Additionally, Emotet is a polymorphic banking Trojan that can evade typical signature-based detection. It has several methods for maintaining persistence, including auto-start registry keys and services. Furthermore, Emotet is Virtual Machine-aware and can generate false indicators if run in a virtual environment


The vmtools.dll file is a modified DLL that both ensures persistence and loads MSBuild.exe, which is the BADNEWS malware renamed to spoof a legitimate Microsoft Visual Studio tool. A number of commands are provided to the attackers, including the ability to download and execute additional information, upload documents of interest, and take screenshots of the desktop. This malware family used the new mutex ‘com_mycompany_apps_appname_new’. This variant of BADNEWS uses different filenames compared to previous versions. All of these files reside in the victim’s %TEMP% directory: Other changes we noticed in this variant include how the malware obfuscates C2 information stored via dead drop resolvers. BADNEWS performs many of the expected functions associated with previous versions including keylogging and identifying files of interest. Unlike a previously reported variant, this version of BADNEWS no longer looks at USB drives for interesting files. It continues to seek out files with the following extensions: In order to prepare for C2 communication, BADNEWS will aggregate various victim information, which is appended to two strings. C2 communication is also updated from prior versions, with the following commands now supported by BADNEWS: During C2 communications, BADNEWS will communicate to the C2 previously identified via HTTP. Through the use of relatively new exploits, as well as a constantly evolving malware toolset, they aim to compromise prominent organizations and individuals to further their goals. One of the malware families tied to this group, BADNEWS, continues to be updated both in how it uses dead drop resolvers, as well as how it communicates with a remote C2 server


Fast-paced intrusion • Very stealthy • Rapidly changing tactics • Employed advanced attack techniques 4) 4. All rights reserved.23 Our Response: Tackled Attacker WMI Usage ADVANCED ATTACK TECHNIQUES 24) 24. Captured entire functions of PS scripts, attacker commands, script output, etc. Wrote indicators based on observed attacker activity • Identified lateral movement, unique backdoors, credential theft, data theft, recon, persistence creation, etc. All rights reserved.25 Our Response: Increased PowerShell Visibility ADVANCED ATTACK TECHNIQUES 26) 26. All rights reserved.27 Our Response: Addressed Ticket Attacks ADVANCED ATTACK TECHNIQUES Event ID 4624 Event ID 4672 Event ID 4634 28) 28. All rights reserved.29 BONUS SLIDE: Even More WMI + PS FUN FACT: We saw the attacker test this backdoor before deployment 30) 30


Stage2.exe is a beaconing implant that performs an HTTPS connection to download a JPG file hosted on Discord’s content delivery network (CDN). Discord’s CDN is a user-created service that allows users to host attachments and is not malicious. The hosted file is retrieved from the following URL


Volgmer payloads have been observed in 32-bit form as either executables or dynamic-link library (.dll) files. The malware uses a custom binary protocol to beacon back to the command and control (C2) server, often via TCP port 8080 or 8088, with some payloads implementing Secure Socket Layer (SSL) encryption to obfuscate communications


Encrypting the data. Exfiltrating gathered data through a POST request or by uploading it to an FTP server. Sending execution logs to a remote server


Spreadsheets and documents with customer lists, investments and trading operations - Internal presentations - Software licenses and credentials for trading software/platforms - Cookies and session information from browsers - Email credentials - Customer credit card information and proof of address/identity documents


The C# variant of RogueRobin attempts to detect if it is executing in a sandbox environment using the same commands as in the PowerShell variant of RogueRobin. The series of commands, as seen in Table 2, include checks for virtualized environments, low memory, and processor counts, in addition to checks for common analysis tools running on the system. The Trojan also checks to see if a debugger is attached to its processes and will exit if it detects the presence of a debugger


APT39 facilitates lateral movement through myriad tools such as Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), Secure Shell (SSH), PsExec, RemCom, and xCmdSvc. Custom tools such as REDTRIP, PINKTRIP, and BLUETRIP have also been used to create SOCKS5 proxies between infected hosts. In addition to using RDP for lateral movement, APT39 has used this protocol to maintain persistence in a victim environment. To complete its mission, APT39 typically archives stolen data with compression tools such as WinRAR or 7-Zip


is responsible for a vast amount of information stealing, and is able to collect information through hooking, clipboard usage, and monitoring the keystate


At this time, Janicab is not detected by most anti-virus software, and it slips right past the built-in defenses of Mac OS X in the hands of an unobservant or unsavvy user. Further, seeing other malware using a signed app is troubling, as it may indicate that Gatekeeper will not offer as much security as had been hoped for


All this information is stored in the C:\Users\Public\Videos\si.ini file and sent in an email message, as an attachment, via SMTPS, using the default port 465. The email body contains the string SI (which probably stands for System Information), the recipient is sym777.g@post.cz. For all email exchange, the message’s Subject: set to the id


If no exceptions occur, the Windows executable drops a DLL file in the user's AppData\Local\Temp\ directory, creates a randomly-named folder under C:\ProgramData\ directory and moves the DLL under that folder as a random file name. This Redaman DLL is made persistent through a scheduled Windows task with the following properties


This report provides background on Windows container vulnerabilities, gives a technical overview of Siloscape and offers recommendations on best practices for securing Windows containers


Fine-tuning DaserfOur analyses revealed Daserf regularly undergo technical improvements to keep itself under the radar against traditional anti-virus (AV) detection. Daserf 1.72 and later versions use the alternative base64+RC4 to encrypt the feedback data, while others use different encryption such as 1.50Z, which uses the Ceasar cipher (which substitutes letters in plaintext with another that corresponds to a number of letters, either upwards or downwards


MSTIC previously tracked ACTINIUM activity as DEV-0157, and this group is also referred to publicly as Gamaredon


At first glance, these links generally cause less suspicion for the targets. After opening the links and several redirections, the victims are led to final phishing domains such as “mobile[.]recover-session-service[.]site” etc


On July 18, 2018, one day after the AZORult update above was announced, we observed a campaign delivering thousands of messages targeting North America that used the new version of AZORult. The messages used employment-related subjects such as “About a role” and “Job Application”. The attached documents used file names in the format of “firstname.surname_resume.doc


The final payload created by the aforementioned process is a well known backdoor, also known as ROKRAT by Cisco Talos. One of its main functions is to steal information. Upon execution, this malware creates 10 random directory paths and uses them for a specially designated purpose


The executables installed by the compiled AutoIt scripts is a backdoor that Molerats has used in many attack campaigns. Based on our research, the Spark backdoor has been used by Molerats since at least early 2017, as it was the main payload in the Operation Parliament campaign reported by Kaspersky


To obtain the session ID and pre-shared key, the payload will issue a query to resolve the following domain: mail. random number between 100000 and 999999>.<c2 name> This request notifies the C2 server that the payload is about to send system specific data as part of the initial handshake


Numbered Panda has a long list of high-profile victims and is known by a number of names including: DYNCALC, IXESHE, JOY RAT, APT-12, etc. Numbered Panda has targeted a variety of victims including but not limited to media outlets, high-tech companies, and multiple governments. Numbered Panda has targeted organizations in time-sensitive operations such as the Fukushima Reactor Incident of 2011, likely filling intelligence gaps in the ground cleanup/mitigation operations. One of the most interesting techniques that Numbered Panda likes to use is to dynamically calculate the Command and Control (C2) port by resolving a DNS. The malware will typically use two DNS names for communication: one is used for command and control; the other is used with an algorithm to calculate the port to communicate to. There are several variations of the algorithm used to calculate the C2 port, but one of the most common is to multiply the first two octets of the IP address and add the third octet to that value. Numbered Panda will frequently use blogs or WordPress in the c2 infrastructure, which helps to make the network traffic look more legitimate. CrowdStrike has observed Numbered Panda targeting high-tech, defense contractors, media organizations, and western governments. Disclosure of this information went through the same IGL process as discussed in the Whois Anchor Panda blog post


To perform this task, the developer used the GDI API: A keylogger is also present in the analyzed sample. The SetWindowsHookEx() API is used to retrieve the stroked keys. The GetKeyNameText() API is used to retrieve a string that represents the name of a key. In addition to the key, the title of the foreground window is stored in order to known where the infected user is typing (by using the GetForegroundWindow() and GetWindowText() API


Key Points PrivateLoader is a downloader malware family that was first identified in early 2021 The loader’s primary purpose is to download and execute additional malware as part of a pay-per-install (PPI) malware distribution service PrivateLoader is used by multiple threat actors to distribute ransomware, information stealers, banking t


AT&T Alien Labs has discovered new malicious files distributed by the threat actor TeamTNT. The use of open-source tools like Lazagne allows TeamTNT to stay below the radar for a while, making it more difficult for anti-virus companies to detect


It also creates a pipe for inter-process communication (IPC) by calling the pipe() function for getting two file descriptors for reading and writing data. It also enables non-blocking I/O for the writing file descriptor by using ioctl


The threat actor abused the stolen credentials to create rogue, high-privileged domain user accounts which they then used to take malicious action. By creating these accounts, they ensured they would maintain access between different waves of the attack. Once the threat actor regains their foothold, they already have access to a high-privileged domain user account


Since September of 2018, Redaman banking malware has been distributed through malspam. These emails have file attachments. These file attachments are archived Windows executable files disguised as a PDF document. In September 2018, the attachments were zip archives. In October 2018, the attachments were zip archives, 7-zip archives, and rar archives. In November 2018, the attachments were rar archives. And in December 2018, the attachments changed to gzip archives with file names ending in .gz


Volexity has worked with multiple victim organizations to assist with incident response efforts and to remedy their compromised systems. This process lead to the identification of different ways the OceanLotus group gains access to the compromised websites and how they maintain access


Anomali Labs has detected a new campaign by the threat group Rocke. In this campaign, the group has changed from using a Python-based malware to a malware written in Golang. The detection of this new malware is nearly non-existent. In addition, the group uses a private mining pool to reduce the risks of being detected


Winnti Linux variant’s core functionality is within ‘libxselinux’. Upon execution, an embedded configuration is decoded from the data section using a simple XOR cipher. An example Python function to decode this configuration is shown below


Lazarus Group is one of the most sophisticated North Korean APTs that has been active since 2009. The group is responsible for many high profile attacks in the past and has gained worldwide attention. The Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence team is actively monitoring its activities and was able to spot a new campaign on Jan 18th 2022


The payload is an application that creates a hidden window (the name of the class and the window is SK_Parasite


kaudited — A file installed as /usr/bin/kaudited. This binary will drop and install several loadable kernel modules (LKMs) on the infected machine. To ensure that the infected machine won’t crash due to the kernel-mode rootkits, it uses different modules for specific kernel versions. The kaudited binary also drops a watchdog component that will monitor the cryptocurrency miner file and process


These credentials are used in a credential stuffing or password spraying attack against the victim’s remote services, such as webmail or other internet reachable mail services. After obtaining a valid account, they use this account to access the victim’s VPN, Citrix or another remote service that allows access to the network of the victim. Information regarding these remotes services is taken from the mailbox, cloud drive, or other cloud resources accessible by the compromised account. As soon as they have a foothold on a system (also known as patient zero or index case), they check the permissions of the account on that system, and attempt to obtain a list of accounts with administrator privileges. With this list of administrator-accounts, the adversary performs another password spraying attack until a valid admin account is compromised. With this valid admin account, a Cobalt Strike beacon is loaded into memory of patient zero. From here on the adversary stops using the victim’s remote service to access the victim’s network, and starts using the Cobalt Strike beacon for remote access and command and control


TIN WOODLAWNTIN WOODLAWN is a targeted threat group, active since at least 2014, that CTU researchers assess with moderate confidence is operated or tasked by the Vietnamese government. TIN WOODLAWN is technically capable and uses a range of techniques including template injection, obfuscated macros and steganography for malware delivery, memory-resident malware, use of native command line scripts for Cobalt Strike persistence, and non-standard command and control channels such as DNS and ICMP.ToolsTaegis™ XDR Adversary Software Coverage Tool


As mentioned in our earlier technical report on Trojan.Hydraq, the back door allows the attacker to perform any of the following activities: - Adjust token privileges. Create, modify, and delete registry subkeys. Retrieve a list of logical drives. Uninstall itself by deleting the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS[FOUR RANDOM CHARACTERS] subkey


Hancitor, a loader that provides Malware as a Service, has been observed distributing malware such as FickerStealer


The third campaign deployed a different custom RPC backdoor to that used in the second campaign. This backdoor used code derived from the publicly available PowerShellRunner tool to execute PowerShell scripts without using powershell.exe. Prior to execution, the PowerShell scripts were stored Base64-encoded in the registry


A typical response from the C2 server is a legitimate-looking webpage containing the string “!DOCTYPE html”, which the malware checks. The malware then locates a Base64-encoded blob, which it decodes and proceeds to load as a shellcode


One of the Cobalt 2.0 Group’s latest campaigns, an attack that leads to a Cobalt Strike beacon and to JavaScript backdoor, was investigated and presented by the Talos research team. Morphisec has investigated different samples from the same campaign. The following analysis presents our findings, focusing on the additional sophistication patterns and attribution patterns


The malware will collect data from the victim machine and write this information to LOCALAPPDATA%\MicroSoft Updatea\uplog.tmp. The following information is collected from the victim


Like most ransomware, Sodinokibi encrypts files and adds a random extension such as “test.jpg.1cd8t9ahd5” (Data Encrypted for Impact, ATT&CK T1486). It also drops a ransom note in folders that contain encrypted files. The name of the ransom note is the random extension added to the encrypted files. For example, if the extension is ".1cd8t9ahd5", the ransom message filename will be called "1cd8t9ahd5-HOW-TO-DECRYPT.txt


The DUBNIUM samples are distributed in various ways, one instance was using a zero-day exploit that targets Adobe Flash, in December 2015


The payload decryption routine uses a custom symmetric algorithm based on arithmetic and byte-shift instructions – a combination of SHL/SHR/SUB/ADD/XOR – with hardcoded keys


This recent APT10 activity has included both traditional spear phishing and access to victim’s networks through service providers. For more information on infection via service providers see M-Trends 2016). APT10 spear phishes have been relatively unsophisticated, leveraging .lnk files within archives, files with double extensions (e.g. Redacted]_Group_Meeting_Document_20170222_doc_.exe) and in some cases simply identically named decoy documents and malicious launchers within the same archive


Malicious web shell activity as observed in the Cybereason solution. Commands executed via a modified version of the China Chopper web shell


This campaign is different from prior activity because a new dropper was observed being used by Rocke that is written in Go (Golang) instead of Python. The detection for the malware on VirusTotal (VT) is nearly non-existent. Figure 1, below, shows the detections for the most recent sample submitted to VT. It can be seen that only one engine successfully detected it as malicious


On June 12, QakBot continued its evolution. The delivery method of a .ZIP file to malicious .VBS was the same, but this time QakBot also dropped a Zloader payload on its victim. Beginning around 14:24 UTC, Falcon Complete observed QakBot threat actors using a new .VBS payload


While the decoy in Figure 2 is displayed, the macro will search the document for the delimiter ###$$$ and write the base64 encoded text that follows this delimiter to the file %APPDATA%\Base.txt. OopsIE Trojan Analysis The OopsIE Trojan delivered in these attacks is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated with ConfuserEx v1.0.0. By using the InternetExplorer application object, all C2 related requests will look as if they came from the legitimate browser and therefore will not contain any anomalous fields within the request, such as custom User-Agents. As seen in the above request, the Trojan will generate a URL for its beacon with the following structure: http://<c2 domain>/chk. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> The Trojan will issue a request to this URL to check (hence the chk string in the URL) to see if the C2 server has a command for the Trojan to run. The C2 server will respond to the Trojan’s request by echoing the value <hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> if it wishes to provide additional commands. If the C2 server does not respond with the appropriate echoed data, the Trojan will create a file named srvCheckresponded.tmp in the SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData folder and write nothing to it before exiting. If the C2 server provides the appropriate echoed data in the response, the Trojan attempts to determine what commands the C2 wishes to run by issuing a request to the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/what. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> After issuing the what command, the Trojan will parse the C2's response for the string Oops, which the Trojan will treat as the C2 making a mistake and will exit


Replying to @ESETresearchAttackers replaced win_fw.dll, an internal component that is executed during IDA Pro installation, with a malicious DLL. The malicious win_fw.dll creates a Windows scheduled task that starts a second malicious component, idahelper.dll, from the IDA plugins folder


The maldocs used in this campaign typically contain a malicious VBA macro that downloads and activates the next stage of the infection chain. Although the VBA macro contains an auto open subroutine, it uses several VBA functions registered to trigger if the "Typing replaces selection" property is enabled in Microsoft Word. Appdata%\desktop.iniThe next stage of the VBS is run using wscript.exe using a command such as:%windir%\System32\wscript.exe //e:vbscript //b <path_to_Stage_2>Macros dropping VBS to disk and running via wscript.exe


The injection function is responsible for resolving all the required API calls. It then opens a handle to the target process by using the OpenProcess API. It uses the SizeOfImage field in the NT header of the DLL to be injected into allocated space into the target process along with a separate space for the init_dll function. The purpose of the init_dll function is to initialize the injected DLL and then pass the control flow to the entry point of the DLL. One thing to note here is a simple CreateRemoteThread method is used to start a thread inside the target process unlike the KernelCallbackTable technique used in our macro


SDBbot is a new remote access Trojan (RAT) written in C++ that has been delivered by the Get2 downloader in recent TA505 campaigns. Its name is derived from the debugging log file (sdb.log.txt) and DLL name (BotDLL[.]dll) used in the initial analyzed sample. SDBbot is composed of three pieces: an installer, a loader, and a RAT component


This would save them the trouble of needing to load additional malware to exfiltrate files or other material. We are aware of no evidence of follow-up interactions between the operators and successful victims as part of any extortion attempts. Furthermore, Stealth Falcon’s use of JavaScript to profile and de-anonymize victims seems inconsistent with a primary motivation of collecting information that could be used for blackmail


Siloscape mimics CExecSvc.exe privileges by impersonating its main thread and then calls NtSetInformationSymbolicLink on a newly created symbolic link to break out of the container


One unique and fairly recent variant is a plain downloader that follows a similar convention to the aforementioned MarkiRAT implants. It also leverages MFC and embeds its logic within a CDialog class, getting executed upon initiation of an MFC dialog object during runtime. The use of this sample diverges from those used by the group in the past, where the payload was dropped by the malware itself, suggesting that the group might be in the process of changing some of its TTPs


The implementation details of Seaduke also have some similarities to WellMess, as both use encrypted cookies to transfer metadata about the data being sent and use obfuscated base64 data in HTTP requests as the contents of communications. These techniques are not unique to Blue Kitsune but provide an interesting correlation between the WellMess backdoor and Blue Kitsune tools used since 2015


1) The group delivers a malicious Office lure document to victims, most likely via a spear-phishing email. 2) These lure documents use titles with government, military, and diplomatic themes, and the file names are written in English or Cyrillic languages. These documents are not very sophisticated, but evidence of infections shows that they’re effective


In past attacks, the Ragnar Locker group has used exploits of managed service providers or attacks on Windows Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections to gain a foothold on targeted networks


DOMAIN} nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts net share route print netstat -nao net localgroup qwinsta WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_BIOS WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_DiskDrive WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_PhysicalMemory WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_Product WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_PnPEntity - whoami /all - arp -a - ipconfig /all - net view /all - cmd /c set - - nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts - net share - route print - netstat -nao - net localgroup - qwinsta - WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_BIOS - WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_DiskDrive - WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_PhysicalMemory - WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_Product - WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_PnPEntity


Once gaining the initial foothold into a container, Hildegard establishes either a tmate session or an IRC channel back to the C2. It is unclear how TeamTNT chooses and tasks between these two C2 channels, as both can serve the same purpose. Unit 42 researchers have not observed any commands in the IRC channel. However, the IRC server's metadata indicates that the server was deployed on Jan


Grants system privileges via Windows services - Uses DLL sideloading technique to evade security solutions - Starts and injects code to a new svchost process to prevent tracking


This component overwrites the master boot record (MBR) of an infected host with a malicious 16-bit bootloader with a SHA256 hash of


Analysis of BRONZE BUTLER's operations, targeting, and capability led CTU researchers to assess that it is likely that the group is located in the PRC. The group has used spearphishing, strategic web compromises (SWCs), and an exploit of a zero-day vulnerability to compromise targeted systems. After exfiltrating targeted data from a network, BRONZE BUTLER typically deletes evidence of its activities. However, it maintains access to compromised environments when possible, periodically revisiting compromised sites to identify new opportunities for data exfiltration


Also, the PlugX that Mustang Panda APT uses has some extra features, including spreading through USB, gathering information, and stealing documents in air-gaped networks via USB


The following commands were used to create and add the DefaultUser account to the local Administrators group, and subsequently hide the account from the Windows logon screen


At this point the C2 sends a JSON with commands to execute, including uploading/downloading files, taking a screenshot and finding *.rar archives on the host


The captured sample used in this analysis is an MSI file named “view-(AVISO)2020.msi” that is spread through a ZIP archive, just as with the previous variant. In the previous analysis, I showed that this MSI file is parsed and executed automatically by MsiExec.exe when a user double clicks on it in Windows OS


After gaining an initial foothold on a compromised system, the NICKEL actors routinely performed reconnaissance on the network, working to gain access to additional accounts or higher-value systems. NICKEL typically deployed a keylogger to capture credentials from users on compromised systems


In 2011, while still at McAfee, he went on to reveal Comment Crew (which he calls Comment Panda) operating alongside Elderwood. It's called that because the group so often uses a technique involving internal software "comment" features on web pages as a tool to infiltrate target computers


The threat actor initially conducts system reconnaissance to assess the AV software installed and the user privilege


We observed the threat group upload a second stage malware, known as BUBBLEWRAP (also known as Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper) to their Dropbox account along with the following command


Finally, it deletes Shadow Volume Copies and prevent the victim from using Shadow Volumes to recover their encrypted files


Deriving C2 URLs from a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) using lists of domain names, subdomains, top-level domains (TLDs), Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs), file names, and file extensions


These fake updates are served via legitimate websites that have been compromised, and use social engineering to trick users into downloading and running a malicious executable. These fake update campaigns appear to be a pay-per-install service that is simply used by INDRIK SPIDER to deliver its malware, as other malware has also been delivered via the same campaigns


Although the developers attempt to use a denylist of files and directories to skip, it was observed encrypting core Windows operating system files, which caused the operating system to become unstable and crash. This was observed when running the ransomware on a Windows 2012 machine


In a new sample of the REvil ransomware discovered by MalwareHunterTeam, a new -smode command-line argument was added that forces the computer to reboot into Safe Mode before encrypting a device


The BackConfig custom trojan has a flexible plug-in architecture for components offering various features, including the ability to gather system and keylog information and to upload and execute additional payloads


Since then, the threat actors have expanded delivery to include malicious spam campaigns, RDP attacks, and other attack vectors. In other reports, threat actors breached at least three managed service providers (MSPs) and used the access to deploy REvil to the MSPs' customers


The following diagram illustrates the changes applied to targeted executables after infection has taken place and how these components interact on execution


Basic system enumeration – The script collects the Windows OS version, computer name, and the contents of a file Ni.txt in $APPDATA path; the file is presumably created and filled by different modules that will be downloaded by the main module


Starting with a simple scan, the first information that the malware can collect is related to files with the following extensions: .docx, .xlsx, .pdf, .pptx, .rar, .zip, .jpg, .bmp, .tiff. For each file found on the disk, it retrieves the full path and the last modified date of the file. That information is encrypted using the AES key mentioned earlier and stored in the file 0.txt. Another scan targets the extensions .dat, .json, .db and like the previous scan it retrieves the full path and last modified date of the file. Then it encrypts them and it stores it under the file 57.txt


Reports system hardware and software configuration. This built-in utility is a command line version of the System Information.app (/Applications/Utilities/System Information.app) and is a mainstay of all types of malware, spyware, post-exploitation tools, adware, and PUPs. Because of its deep insight into the entire environment, it can be used for a variety of purposes relating to environment discovery, detection evasion and anti-analysis


As seen in the above screenshot, there is a large overlap in unique strings in both samples. The original sample involved in the forbes.com breach used HTTP, which is consistent with the original variant discussed in this blog post. It should be noted that while the newest variant that uses direct network communication over port 22 no longer uses HTTP, references to the HTTP strings are still found within the sample itself. This is most likely due to code re-used by the attackers


In late July 2021, we identified an ongoing spear phishing campaign pushing Konni Rat to target Russia. Konni was first observed in the wild in 2014 and has been potentially linked to the North Korean APT group named APT37


The orchestrator is the main component of the Carbon framework. It is mainly used to inject code into a process that communicates legitimately over the Internet and to dispatch the tasks received from the injected library to other computers on the same network either through named pipes or TCP


The HTTP variant checks if Kaspersky is installed on the victim’s machine by searching for the existence of files in the Kaspersky installation folder


The Zebrocy Trojan gathers system specific information that it will send to the C2 server via an HTTP POST request to the above URL. Like other Zebrocy samples, this Trojan collects system specific information it will send to the C2 server by running the command SYSTEMINFO & TASKLIST on the command line and by enumerating information about connected storage devices. This specific variant of Zebrocy will also send a screenshot of the victim host as a JPEG image to the C2 server


PowerShower, named and previously disclosed by Palo Alto Networks in their blogspot (see above), is a malicious piece of PowerShell designed to receive PowerShell and VBS modules to execute on the local computer. This malware has been used since October 2018 by Cloud Atlas as a validator and now as a second stage


We observed a number of phishing emails that reference an invoice, as seen in Figure 1. The attachment in these emails is a weaponized Microsoft Office document containing a malicious macro that – when enabled – leads to the download of Hancitor


These are later used by the attackers to send targeted emails to the victims, with the obtained information being used to lure victims into opening those emails


The trojanized update file is a standard Windows Installer Patch file that includes compressed resources associated with the update, including the trojanized SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll component


Cisco Talos has observed another malware campaign that utilizes malicious Microsoft Office documents (maldocs) to spread the remote access trojan (RAT) ObliqueRAT. ObliqueRAT has been linked to the Transparent Tribe APT group in the past


Xbash is a novel and complex Linux malware and the newest work of an active cybercrime group. From its characteristics and behaviors, we could realize many trends in current IoT/Linux security battleground


Once we deobfuscated it, we found that the script contained a large array of hard coded domain names, with one of them being randomly selected and used for subsequent DNS queries. It is important to note that while the Powershell scripts for stages 3 and 4 contain two arrays of domains, the first array is only used if a failure condition is reached while the sample is using the second array. Figure 8: Stage 3 Domain List The 'logic' function present within this Powershell script randomly selects a C2 domain from the second array in the script and uses this domain to perform an initial lookup. If the result of the initial DNS TXT record request is empty or in the case the lookup fails, the 'do_lookup' function is then called and randomly selects a domain from the first array in the script. Interestingly, the domains used by the 'do_lookup' function did not appear to have active 'www' or 'mail' TXT records. The script also uses specific subdomains which are combined with the domains and used for the initial DNS TXT record queries performed by the malware. The malware uses the contents of the TXT record in the response to these queries to determine what action to take next. For instance, the first subdomain is 'www' and a query response with a TXT record containing 'www' will instruct the script to proceed. The response to this DNS request results in the transmission of the fourth stage malware, stored within the TXT record as displayed in Figures 10 and 11. Due to the size of the Stage 4 payload, DNS makes use of TCP for this transaction


It writes a file using two data structures: one associated with the file and other used for reading data from the C&C


The only way to ensure that deleted files, as well as files that you encrypt with EFS, are safe from recovery is to use a secure delete application. Secure delete applications overwrite a deleted file's on-disk data using techniques that are shown to make disk data unrecoverable, even using recovery technology that can read patterns in magnetic media that reveal weakly deleted files. SDelete (Secure Delete) is such an application. Note that SDelete securely deletes file data, but not file names located in free disk space


Download and execution of ntbscan (SHA-1: 90da10004c8f6fafdaa2cf18922670a745564f45) – NetBIOS scanner tool widely used by multiple APT actor including the prolific Chinese group APT10 - Execution of Windows built-in networking utility tools - Access to the victim’s files, especially documents located on the Desktop


Executive summary . The PROMETHIUM threat actor — active since 2012 — has been exposed multiple times over the past several years.. However, this has not deterred this actor from continuing and expanding their activities. The group has at least four new trojanized setup files we observed: Firefox (a browser), VPNpro (a VPN client), DriverPack (a pack of drivers) and 5kPlayer (a media player). How did it work. Talos could not pinpoint the initial attack vector, however, the use of trojanized installation files to well-known applications is consistent with the previously documented campaigns. The trojanized setup will install the malware and the legitimate application, which is a good way to disguise its activities. PROMETHIUM has been resilient over the years. We have no evidence that the websites of the real applications were compromised to host the malicious installer. We can conclude that the PROMETHIUM threat actor is interested in new countries or the malicious framework developed by this threat actor is exported in more countries than previously thought. The usage of the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry key has a persistence mechanism that has been replaced by the creation of a service. The malicious service: rmaserv.exe . This binary has two main features. Conclusion . The PROMETHIUM threat actor is dedicated and resilient, exposing them hasn't refrained them from moving forward with their agenda


As part of Reflective DLL loading the malware performs the following tasks on the DLL it has unwrapped in memory: Copy the unwrapped DLL into new locations in its own memory space. Build imports required by the DLL (based on the IAT of the DLL) - Copy the unwrapped DLL into new locations in its own memory space. Build imports required by the DLL (based on the IAT of the DLL


4) Special attention was given to the design of the network communication, in order to reduce the noise a large number of encrypted machines may generate while contacting the Command and Control servers. 5) The encryption scheme is solid – using the AES and RSA algorithms


The tool was primarily used by the attackers to move laterally on the victim’s network. PowerShell: Microsoft scripting tool that was used to run commands to download payloads, traverse compromised networks, and carry out reconnaissance. WinSCP: Open source FTP client used to exfiltrate data from targeted organizations


While investigating the domains and infrastructure used by the phishing components of Gorgon Group, Unit 42 researchers witnessed several common operational security flaws with Gorgon Group's actors throughout their many campaigns. It was one of these OPSEC failures that gave us an interesting cross-section of malware Gorgon Group is using. Included in the directories were a combination of files leveraged in targeted attacks mentioned above against nation states. Additionally, there was a plethora of malware samples that were criminal in nature


Both variants of ServHelper use the same HTTP C&C protocol on port 443 (HTTPS) and, less frequently, port 80 (HTTP). An example of the initial phone home to the C&C server is shown in Figure 5


IcedID’s operators probably plan on targeting businesses because they added a network propagation module to the malware from the get-go. IcedID possesses the ability to move to other endpoints, and X-Force researchers also observed it infecting terminal servers


Reaver proceeds to write a shortcut file to ‘%TEMP%\~WUpdate.lnk’. This file is then copied to a filename of ‘Windows Update.lnk’, which is placed in the startup path previously identified. This shortcut file points to the path of the previously written ‘Applet.cpl’ file. Finally, Reaver.v1 will execute the ‘~WUpdate.lnk’ file in a new process, thus loading the recently dropped malicious CPL file. In the event this is successful, the malware will use the following path to store any dropped files


The attackers used the Windows Management Instrumentation Command Line Utility (wmic.exe) to execute commands on remote computers, such as adding a new user or executing additional downloaded PowerShell scripts. Cobalt Strike was also used to carry out credential dumping using ProcDump and to empty log files


3, 2019): On May 16, 2019 FireEye's Advanced Practices team attributed the remaining "suspected APT33 activity" (referred to as GroupB in this blog post) to APT33, operating at the behest of the Iranian government. The actor leveraged this persistence mechanism to download and execute OS-dependent variants of the publicly available .NET POSHC2 backdoor as well as a newly identified PowerShell-based implant self-named POWERTON. Of note, Advanced Practices separately established that APT33 began using POSHC2 as of at least July 2, 2018, and continued to use it throughout the duration of 2018. At one point in late-August, after the POSHC2 kill date, the adversary used RULER.HOMEPAGE to directly download POWERTON, bypassing the intermediary stages previously observed. FireEye Intelligence has previously reported that APT33 has ties to destructive malware, and they pose a heightened risk to critical infrastructure. The operators behind each of the described intrusions are using publicly available but not widely understood tools and techniques in addition to proprietary implants as needed. Custom Backdoor: POWERTON . POWERTON is a backdoor written in PowerShell; FireEye has not yet identified any publicly available toolset with a similar code base, indicating that it is likely custom-built. FireEye has observed an increase in targeted adversaries challenging and subverting security controls on Exchange and Office365. At FireEye, our decisions are data driven, but data provided to us is often incomplete and missing pieces must be inferred based on our expertise in order for us to respond to intrusions effectively. Credential harvesting phishing scams, where harvested credentials may be sold, re-used, or documented permanently elsewhere on the internet


The malware sets its persistence mechanism by creating a RunKey in the registry to ensure its survival after system reboot events


Audio surveillance: The malware uses the NAudio library to interact with the microphone and manage the audio stream. The library is stored server-side and pushed to the victim’s machine using a special command. The bot will display the messages using a standard message box. The log includes the process name used by the victim, and keystrokes. The theft is performed by a specific component that enumerates credentials saved in various browsers. Process manager: The attacker can obtain a list of running processes and terminate these by using a specific button


HAYMAKER is a backdoor that can download and execute additional payloads in the form of modules. It also conducts basic victim profiling activity, collecting the computer name, running process IDs, %TEMP% directory path and version of Internet Explorer. It communicates encoded system information to a single hard coded command and control (C2) server, using the system’s default User-Agent string. BUGJUICE is a backdoor that is executed by launching a benign file and then hijacking the search order to load a malicious dll into it. BUGJUICE defaults to TCP using a custom binary protocol to communicate with the C2, but can also use HTTP and HTTPs if directed by the C2. It has the capability to find files, enumerate drives, exfiltrate data, take screenshots and provide a reverse shell. SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that communicates with its C2 server through HTTP requests. The malware’s capabilities include taking a system survey, access to the filesystem, executing commands and a reverse shell


One of the custom tools used by the Leafminer group is a rebranded version of the widespread post-exploitation tool Mimikatz


The default case when the service tag is empty allows the malware to treat the contents of the response from the C2 as a command to execute via the Go library functions os.exec.Command or os.exec.Start. The format of the received command is checked against the below regex pattern for validity before executing and the command is read from the body of the message received from the C2


In 2014, Imminent Monitor started supporting third-party plugins. The first of these offered the ability to turn the webcam light off while monitoring. Shockwave™ wrote: “Hey, good job on being the first to release a plugin for Imminent Monitor


Where the number of passed parameters is one, the payload will read the sys.bin.url file from %appdata%\systemconfig. It will then spawns a new svchost process as C:\\windows\\system32\\svchost.exe –k update in suspended state and injects the payload. Finally, it patches the entry point of svchost.exe so it can execute the malicious payload after the ResumeThread call


This module intercepts HWP documents on an infected computer. The HWP file format is similar to Microsoft Word documents, but supported by Hangul, a South Korean word processing application from the Hancom Office bundle. This malware module works independently of the others and maintains its own Bulgarian e-mail account. The account is hardcoded in the module along with the master’s e-mail to which it sends intercepted documents. It is interesting that the module does not search for all the HWP files on infected computer, but reacts only to those that are opened by the user and steals them. This behavior is very unusual for a document-stealing component and we do not see it in other malicious toolkits


In the old campaign the actor used TextBoxes to store its data while in the new one the content has been base64 encoded within the document content. In the new campaign JavaScript files have been used to execute batch and PowerShell files. The new campaign uses Powershell and URLMON API calls to download the cab file while in the old campaign it used certutil to download the cab file. The new campaign has used two different UAC bypass techniques based on the victim’s OS while in the old one the actor only used the Token Impersonation technique. In the new campaign the actor has developed a new variant of Konni RAT that is heavily obfuscated. Also, its configuration is encrypted and is not base64 encoded anymore. It also does not use FTP for exfiltration


TEARDROP is a memory only dropper that runs as a service, spawns a thread and reads from the file “gracious_truth.jpg”, which likely has a fake JPG header. TEARDROP does not have code overlap with any previously seen malware. We believe that this was used to execute a customized Cobalt Strike BEACON


The adversary used the built-in lateral movement possibilities in Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has various methods for deploying its beacons at newly compromised systems. We have seen the adversary using SMB, named pipes, PsExec, and WinRM. They continue lateral movement and discovery in an attempt to identify the data of interest


It is used by the financially motivated GOLD SOUTHFIELD threat group, which distributes ransomware via exploit kits, scan-and-exploit techniques, RDP servers, and backdoored software installers. CTU™ researchers attribute GandCrab to the GOLD GARDEN threat group


CWS or WSA web scanning prevents access to malicious websites, including watering hole attacks, and detects malware used in these attacks


The attackers typically distribute Netwalker ransomware with the use of a reflective PowerShell loader script that has been protected from casual analysis with several layers of obfuscation


BRONZE UNION appears to use a combination of self-registered IP addresses and commercial VPN services in its command and control (C2) and operational infrastructure. The threat actors also integrate infrastructure they likely previously compromised for espionage purposes. For example, CTU researchers identified the group using IP addresses owned by several, presumably compromised, research organizations to interact with web shells in other target environments


As mentioned previously, this backdoor also supports loading plugins. The server creates a thread that searches for files matching the following pattern lPH*.dll. If such a file exists, it is loaded and its export function ModuleStart is called. Among the various plugins we have located so far, one is able to steal recent files and files from USB thumb drives


Phishing emails continued to use links to external ZIP or RAR archives, which ultimately contained an executable with the extension SCR. The attackers also made extensive use of Hostinger’s cheap web hosting services to deliver initial payloads


After decrypting the C&C server address, the shellcode proceeds to send an HTTP GET request to fetch the resource: “msdn.cpp” on the server


The purpose of the bytecode is to decrypt the embedded payload, load it into memory reflectively and execute it


The backdoor contain narrow capabilities: download and upload files, run commands and send the attackers the results. However short the list, they allow the attackers to upload and execute additional tools for further reconnaissance and lateral movement


Network analysis — run one of the plugins to retrieve Active Directory and network information (Fig


Before running the above command to open the decoy document, the shellcode enumerates the running processes on the system, specifically looking for processes created for an executable with a filename that starts with “avp. presumably in an attempt to find Kaspersky’s antivirus process. If the process is found, the shellcode will not open the decoy document and exits


This RAT is also known for its keylogging and file transfer functionality. As such, any remote attacker can load any files onto the infected machine or even steal documents


The malware will setup the miner and then the miner will persist it in the system in two ways: 1) by adding itself as a service if the malware gains admin privileges or 2) by adding the batch file to the startup folder


Registered and active during late June 2020, newspointview[.]com has been used with more recent SombRAT variants as the primary C2 domain


An example of these tasks is shown below: • write a file and execute it with CreateProcess() capturing all of the standard output • update C&C configuration, plugin storage, etc • update autoruns • write arbitrary files to the filesystem (“File Upload”) • read arbitrary files from the filesystem (“File Download”) • update itself • uninstall • push task results to C2 servers


Exploits a kernel privilege escalation vulnerability to gain SYSTEM privileges using CVE-2018-8453. Whitelists files, folders and extensions from encryption. Encrypts files on local and network storage. Customizes the name and body of the ransom note, and the contents of the background image. Exfiltrates encrypted information on the infected host to remote controllers. REvil uses Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) for communication with its controllers


In the old campaign the actor used TextBoxes to store its data while in the new one the content has been base64 encoded within the document content. In the new campaign JavaScript files have been used to execute batch and PowerShell files. The new campaign uses Powershell and URLMON API calls to download the cab file while in the old campaign it used certutil to download the cab file. The new campaign has used two different UAC bypass techniques based on the victim’s OS while in the old one the actor only used the Token Impersonation technique. In the new campaign the actor has developed a new variant of Konni RAT that is heavily obfuscated. It also does not use FTP for exfiltration


Once you have set up the database and logged into the BloodHound web application, you need to pull AD data from your environment using the BloodHound PowerShell ingestor. Figure 1 shows a sample command that searches all domains in the forest (-SearchForest) and the folder location used to save the resulting CSV files


If the DoublePulsar backdoor does not exist, then the SMB worm attempts to compromise the target using the Eternalblue SMBv1 exploit. After the first thread determines the local network subnet, the SMB worm scans local addresses beginning at the start of the netblock and increasing by one to the end of the netblock


This Unix binary is widely used by many malware families to determine the device’s unique ID (for campaign tracking), usually in the form of the machine’s serial number. This may or may not be hashed with another utility (e.g. md5) before being sent to the C2. To facilitate anti-analysis and evasion, ioreg is also used by some threat actors to determine whether the device is running in a virtual environment


It uses a GetCurrentProcessID to find the process ID of the current process. It compares the UniqueProcessID member of the SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO_EX structure with the current process ID


Encryption is definitely the simplest method to hide the C&C server. We have encountered cases where the port has been stored in the data section, in the Delphi form data, or randomly chosen from a range


The Helminth implant is routinely delivered through macro-enabled Microsoft Office documents requiring user interaction to execute an obfuscated Visual Basic Script


1) The malicious macro scans the victim’s Outlook inbox and looks for the strings “$$cpte” and “$$ecpte”. 2) Then the macro will open a CMD shell that will execute whatever instruction / command is in between the strings. 4) The macro searches for the special strings in the “Deleted Items” folder to find the attacker’s email address and sends the data back to the attackers via email. 5) Lastly, the macro will delete any evidence of the emails received or sent by the attackers


A recent lull in the distribution of spam spreading information-stealing malware via the Hancitor downloader has been snapped


There are three types of URLs present in the decrypted configuration. The first type of URL listed in the configuration data is used for the plain HTTP (that is, non-Tor) communication with C&C servers. The bot reports to the C&C server using the typical request pattern: for example, the initial checkin to the C&C server is in the form of: cfg_url + “/images/” + encoded_data + (.jpeg||.gif||.bmp


Similar to many other ransomware operators, CARBON SPIDER not only encrypted victim files using Darkside, but also exfiltrated data for publication on a dedicated leak site (DLS) hosted on Tor. For exfiltration, CARBON SPIDER primarily leveraged the MEGASync client for hosting provider MEGA but also employed GoToAssist


They stop the Volume Shadow Copy service; the ransomware itself includes a command to delete existing shadow copies


Emotet artifacts are typically found in arbitrary paths located off of the AppData\Local and AppData\Roaming directories. Persistence is typically maintained through Scheduled Tasks or via registry keys. Additionally, Emotet creates randomly-named files in the system root directories that are run as Windows services


The backdoor also creates a separate thread that installs a Windows hook procedure on message WH_KEYBOARD_LL, through which it can intercept keystrokes. We believe this is mainly used to intercept credentials from other browsers, specifically Google Chrome


Kimsuky is a highly motivated APT that has traditionally targeted entities in South Korea. The APT group has used a variety of malware such as Gold Dragon, Babyshark and Appleseed to target entities ranging from defense to education and think tanks. Some file enumerators will exfiltrate all files with specific extensions. What's interesting here, however, is that the attackers knew exactly which files they were looking for


The Trojan obfuscates its executable code prior to compilation, rather than packing it like most other ransomware, making it harder for researchers to reverse engineer and analyze the malicious code. It also obscures the links to the necessary API function, and stores hashes to strings rather than the actual strings. Upon installation, the Trojan reviews the directory its executable is started from, and if it spots an attempt to launch it from an ‘incorrect’ directory – such as a potential automated sandbox – it exits. Before encrypting files on a victim device, SynAck checks the hashes of all running processes and services against its own hard coded list. If it finds a match, it tries to kill the process


Before being sent to the server, the data structure has to pass through shaping as shown in Fig


When the backdoor is configured to use HTTPS to communicate with the C2, the functionality is largely the same as when in HTTP mode. The differences are that it lacks the options to update a session key due to encryption being handled by the TLS layer and it also does not have the option to send data to and from the C2 in the chunking mode previously described. In addition, only one transmission is made to the C2 when the malware is establishing a connection as there is no exchange of an AES session key. The hello message that is sent contains the same plaintext data as the HTTP mode


For persistence and remote control, the script downloads another base64-encoded Python script from hxxps://ptpb[.]pw/OAZG. After several steps of de-obfuscation, we found the attackers using EmPyre for post-exploitation control


The Magic Hound campaign used Word and Excel documents containing malicious macros as a delivery method, specifically attempting to load either the Pupy RAT or meterpreter which we have called MagicHound.Rollover. The malicious macros were all designed to use Windows PowerShell to download a shellcode-based payload from a remote server. We discovered two different techniques used in the PowerShell scripts, the first being a straightforward execute command of a string retrieved from the remote server. The second technique appeared to be from a tool called Magic Unicorn, an open source module for meterpreter. Specifically, we discovered code in the PowerShell script that was a match for code in Magic Unicorn containing the comment “one line shellcode injection with native x86 shellcode


Throughout the year, Volexity identified multiple Vietnamese-language news websites that appeared to be compromised, as they were being used to load an OceanLotus web profiling framework. The exact functionality varied from site to site, but the goal of these frameworks was to gather information about site visitors and, in some cases, deliver malware. This code appears to be a variation of what Volexity has previously described as Framework A


For example, here is a folder and a list of files created by picking the C:\Windows\system32\TCPSVCS.exe executable as a source of data


The attackers used both families concurrently from late last year through November 2017 and there is some C2 infrastructure overlap between the two families, as well as links to historical reporting. Reaver Malware Analysis To date, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 has identified 10 unique samples and three distinct variants of a new malware family we have named “Reaver”. As such, we identify each variant as Reaver.v1, Reaver.v2, and Reaver.v3. Reaver.v1 has been observed delivering a payload that uses HTTP for network communication, while versions 2 and 3 use a payload that uses raw TCP connections for this communication. The flow for Reaver is as shown


Another payload of the Ecipekac loader, which we call SodaMaster (a.k.a DelfsCake), is also a new fileless malware. In our research we found more than 10 samples of SodaMaster. The only differences were in the configuration data, including a hardcoded C2, an encoded RSA key and additional data for calculating a mutex value


When executed, the DLL drops and launches using a WinExec API call. This stage of the Valak malware uses a malicious JavaScript file with a random name that changes per execution


The script modifies Windows Defender settings to exclude the target logical drive it is going to wipe from scheduled and real-time scanning


MSTIC has observed NICKEL actors using exploits against unpatched systems to compromise remote access services and appliances. Upon successful intrusion, they have used credential dumpers or stealers to obtain legitimate credentials, which they used to gain access to victim accounts. NICKEL actors created and deployed custom malware that allowed them to maintain persistence on victim networks over extended periods of time. MSTIC has also observed NICKEL perform frequent and scheduled data collection and exfiltration from victim networks


To load the driver, a new service is created using the API CreateServiceW. The name and display name for this service is the 4-character name used for the file name. Next, StartServiceW is called in a loop five times to ensure the driver is loaded. Immediately after the driver is loaded, the service is removed by deleting the entire registry key


Once the attackers identify the files of interest, the module is instrumented for exfiltration of the files.The VBScript-based file recon module used by the attackers is somewhat different. The URL constructed had the following format:http://<attacker_controlled_domain/>report.php


Between 2016 and 2020, we have seenScreenConnect and Onehub used in malicious cyber activity by different, unassociated threat actors. For example, between 2016 and 2019 unknown threat actors targeted IT outsourcing firms, including compromising US-based Cognizant and India-based Wipro. 7] The actors responsible for these attacks used ScreenConnect to connect to endpoints on client networks, enabling them to conduct further lateral movements and automated actions on objectives. During an incident impacting Cognizant and their client Maritz Holdings, actors used ScreenConnect to propagate to other connected systems and caused over $1.8 million (USD) in losses through a gift card fraud scheme. 6] In 2019, another threat group used ConnectWise to execute PowerShell commands in their target environments. 7] In 2020, ScreenConnect/ConnectWise has been utilized by the cybercriminal group Pinchy Spider (GOLD SOUTHFIELD, GOLD GARDEN, Sodinokibi, REvil, GandCrab) to distribute Sodinokibi ransomware


Stage 1: A Master Boot Record (MBR) locker used to overwrite the operating system's MBR, which effectively prevents the operating system from loading successfully - Stage 2: A disk-wiper used to wipe and destroy files on the target machine


The MuddyWaters group has carried out a large number of attacks and demonstrated advanced social engineering, in addition to the active development of attacks, infrastructure and the use of new methods and techniques


BADNEWS Much of BADNEWS has remained consistent from when it was originally discussed by Forcepoint in August 2016. To briefly recap, the BADNEWS malware family acts as a backdoor, with communication occurring over HTTP. A number of commands are provided to the attackers, including the ability to download and execute additional information, upload documents of interest, and take screenshots of the desktop. This tactic uses public web services to host content that contains encoded commands that are decoded by the malware


As we can see, it simply downloads a file from secure.dropinbox[.]pw using HTTP on port 443 (not HTTPS), and proceeds to decrypt the file using AES-128 prior to executing it. At this point, Cardinal RAT has been downloaded and executed, and execution is directed to this sample. Of course, the Carp Downloader is not required to download Cardinal RAT, however, based on our visibility, it has exclusively done so


Many fields in the installation program are forged into Acrobat Reader installation program, and the interface after running is related to Acrobat Reader


The use of the legitimate regsvr32.exe application to run a .sct file is an AppLocker bypass technique originally discovered by Casey Smith (@subtee), which eventually resulted in a Metasploit module. The WINDOWSTEMP.ps1 script is a dropper that decodes an embedded executable using base64 and decompresses it with the System.IO.Compression.GzipStream object. The WindowsTemplate.exe executable is a new variant of RogueRobin written in C


Juniper Threat Labs has been monitoring a campaign that pushes a new IcedID banking trojan. This new campaign changes tactics by injecting into msiexec.exe to conceal itself and use full steganography for downloading its modules and configurations. Previous versions of IcedID injected into svchost.exe and downloaded encrypted modules and config as “.dat” files. IcedID is a banking malware that performs Man-in-the-Browser attacks to steal financial information


Execution through API (Batch file for example). - Application processes discovery with some procedures as the hashes of the name, and directly for the name of the process. File and directory discovery: to search files to encrypt. Encrypt files. Create files


The malware uses at least three separate encryption methods for its traffic, depending on the type of message. The first method, implemented within HTTPDLL.dll, is used for the decryption of values and traffic relating to the HTTP GET requests (i) and (ii) discussed above. It appears to use an implementation of AES to encrypt the data which is then transmitted in its encrypted format. The key (shown in the image below) is apparently static, at least among the samples tested, and generated by drawing byte values from multiple parts of the binary and performing a number of bitwise operations on them


1) The script uses the function fromCharCode() that returns a string created from a sequence of UTF-16 code units. By using this function, it avoids explicitly writing commands it wants to execute and it hides the actual code it is initiating. In particular, the script uses this function to hide information related to process names. To the best of our knowledge, this method was not used in early versions of the spam campaign. 2) The script uses the function radador(), which returns a randomized integer. This function is able to obfuscate code so that every iteration of the code is presented differently. In contrast to the first method of obfuscation, this has been used effectively since early versions of the Astaroth Trojan campaign


Implant Type – WaterBear is a stage-2 implant with many capabilities; BendyBear is a stage-0 downloader