The second version does not carry the payload directly but instead downloads it from a C2 into the same location as before. The C2 server address is embedded in the main executable in the TinkaOTP bundle. The hardcoded download and execution code are easily visible as they are unencrypted, plain UTF strings in the binary


Guloader is a downloader that has been active since 2019. It is known to deliver various malware, more notably: Agent-Tesla, Netwire, FormBook, Nanocore, and Parallax RAT


All of the backdoors identified – excluding RoyalDNS – required APT15 to create batch scripts in order to install its persistence mechanism. This was achieved through the use of a simple Windows run key


Once communication with the C2 server has been established, QakBot is known to download and use additional modules in order to perform its malicious operations


This DLL has no other noticeable characteristics, as it functions like a typical malicious sideload. After loading the encrypted payload in memory, it transfers the execution to a shellcode that is located at the beginning of the file. Once loaded in memory, the ZeroT shellcode does not present any kind of obfuscation, unlike that for PlugX. As in the new PlugX dropper detailed below, this is done using RC4 and RtlDecompressBuffer. As in PlugX samples, the PE header of ZeroT has been tampered with, specifically the “MZ” and “PE” constants (Fig


One legitimate executable, sometimes signed, and vulnerable to dynamic-link library (DLL) sideloading - One malicious DLL loaded by the legitimate file - One binary file usually containing obfuscated code, unpacked in memory by the malicious DLL


The `Download3rdStage` will first decode `https://discord.com` and try to connect to it. Then, it performs a time-based anti-debug check, as shown in the code below. If any of these checks fail, the DLL will not download the third stage


Learn more about our Personal Data Protection PolicyAccept Cookies . DeepMalwareAnalysis . Joe Security's Blog . TrickBot's new API-Hammering explained . Published on: 13.07.2020 As usual, at Joe Security, we keep a close eye on evasive malware. It turned out to be a new TrickBot sample using API hammering to bypass analysis. Two Stage API Hammering . Right after the entry point, the sample tries to load taskmgr.exe as a DLL: This is likely a trick to bypass emulators that do not check if a given DLL exists if LoadLibraryEx is called. Since before the loop FreeConsole has been called all printf calls do basically nothing: This code has been directly copied from the documentation of printf: So what is the purpose of those numerous printf loops. As a result, the massive amount of calls delay the execution process and overload the sandbox with junk data. This behavior is called API Hammering. API Hammering is not a new technique, we have already seen it several years ago e.g. Joe Sandbox detects the API hammering successfully and rates it as malicious: Right after the printf flood, the sample performs another loop to delay execution by creating and writing to a temporary file - the second stage. In between it performs random sleeps: Again, the purpose is to overload the sandbox and delay the execution. No matter what technology your favorite sandbox uses, it has to handle API Hammering correctly


When generating the URLs within the HTTP POST and GET requests, XAgent sets one HTTP parameter using a specific data structure that contains this agent_id value. This parameter transmits the agent_id to the C2 server to obtain commands the actor wishes to execute on the compromised system. The data structure used to transmit the agent_id to the C2 is as follows


Inception’s malware is modular and the attackers will load plugins based on requirements for each attack. The group has used a range of plugins in recent attacks, some of which are improved versions of plugins used in 2014, while others were previously unseen


When running under a limited UAC account, the installer extracts d3d9.dll and creates a persistence key under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Run


The process begins with the consistent execution of a malicious DLL using the legitimate regsvr32.exe Windows Utility. Once executed, the DLL is deleted from the system and its components are dropped to the system


Following the initial compromise, in many instances the BackdoorDiplomacy group employed open-source reconnaissance and red-team tools to evaluate the environment for additional targets of opportunity and lateral movement. Among the tools documented are


Once the library is called by one of the triggering events implemented in its code, it reads a configuration file from a shared Google Document. If it is not able to connect to the address, it uses a hardcoded one


Hildegard uses LD_PRELOAD to hide the malicious process launched inside the containers. The malware modified the /etc/ld.so.preload file to intercept shared libraries’ imported functions


The threat actor connected via Remote Desktop from a Domain Controller to a vCenter server and opened a PowerShell console, then used the PowerShell command -ep bypass to circumvent the execution policy. Using the Windows Azure Active Directory PowerShell Module, the threat actor connected to the victim’s O365 tenant and began performing enumeration queries


Targets are sent spear phishing e-mails that lead them to a web site displaying a lure document and are immediately prompted to install a malicious Google Chrome extension. It then redirects the user to install a “Font Manager” extension from the Chrome Web Store, as seen in Figure 2. Figure 2: HTML Source of Phishing Page The malicious extensions, now removed from the Chrome Web Store, contain reviews left by the threat actor using compromised Google+ accounts. It should be noted however, that some users reported deleting the extension immediately because it prevented the Chrome browser from functioning properly. The malicious Chrome extensions declare permissions to run on every URL in the browser, as seen in Figure 3. Loading jQuery.js from an external site makes no sense, since the latest version of extension has a legitimate jQuery.js included in the extension bundle. Figure 4: Given the threat actor’s propensity for password theft, and the fact that the malicious Chrome extensions were situated to read data from every website, it's likely that the intent is to steal browser cookies and passwords. Figure 5: Certificate used to sign MECHANICAL/GREASE While the threat actors did use a few tools to automate intrusions, we also found a ZIP archive of tools that demonstrate their propensity for password theft to propagate. Advise users to be wary of any prompts to install browser extensions, even if they are hosted on an official extension site. They spent significant time and resources doing reconnaissance on their targets, as evidenced by the comments left on the Chrome extension page


After the payload execution it reaches out to the C2 via POST request as shown below


All RDAT samples have malicious verdicts in WildFire and have protections in place through Cortex XDR. DNS tunneling protocols used for C2 communications are blocked via DNS Security. All C2 domains are classified as Command-and-Control for URL Filtering. AutoFocus customers can monitor activity via the rdat_backdoor tag


Endpoint Protection . The Trojan.Hydraq Incident . It has been about a week since news of the mysterious Hydraq Trojan (also known as Aurora) attack broke with the unveiling of a threat by Google to pull its operations out of China. In addition the blog also mentioned that a host of other large corporations were also targets of this same attack. In this attack a PDF file was used to exploit the Adobe Acrobat, Reader, and Flash Player Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2009-1862/BID35759). This PDF installed a Trojan horse which was an earlier version of the current Trojan.Hydraq. Considering the efforts that the attackers put into staging the attack as a whole, the end malware is not so sophisticated. Download a remote file, save it as %Temp%\mdm.exe, and then execute it. This means the remote attacker has the ability to see in real time any user interface activity as if they were sitting right next to the user. As described in the previously posted blog (Hydraq - An Attack of Mythical Proportions), an unpatched Internet Explorer vulnerability (BID 37815) was used as one of the propagation vectors for this particular Trojan.Hydraq attack. This security hole allows remote exploitation, which means that attackers can run any malicious code of their liking on a victim’s machine by taking advantage of the vulnerability. Prevention & Mitigation Trojan.Hydraq has been known to be spread through specially crafted PDF files and also through malicious Web sites. The attacker can exploit this issue by supplying a malicious Flash ('.swf') file or by embedding a malicious Flash application in a PDF file


We mentioned earlier that docx files (like xlsx and pptx) are part of the OOXML standard. The document defining this standard[6], describes the syntax and values that can be used as an example. An interesting file to look at is the ‘settings.xml’ file that can be discovered in the ‘Word’ container of the docx zip file. This file contains settings with regards to language, markup and more. First, we extracted all the data from the settings.xml files and started to compare. All the documents below contained the same language values


FireEye has dubbed the cybercrime gang FIN5. One of the most unique things about FIN5 is that in every intrusion we responded to where FIN5 has been active, legitimate access was identified. They had valid user credentials to remotely log into the network," said Barry Vengerik, principal threat analyst at FireEye. No sexy zero-days, no remote exploits -- not even spearphishing


It looks like GrowlHelper creates an executable named Software Update Check when it thinks it’s online. I was pretty excited when I first found this, but quickly realized it just drops a copy of itself with a different name


FireEye assesses APT33 may be behind a series of intrusions and attempted intrusions within the engineering industry. FireEye's Managed Defense has responded to and contained numerous intrusions that we assess are related. The actor is leveraging publicly available tools in early phases of the intrusion; however, we have observed them transition to custom implants in later stage activity in an attempt to circumvent our detection


PowerPunch also provides an excellent example of this. The key is applied to an executable payload downloaded directly from adversary infrastructure, allowing for an encryption key unique to the target host (highlighted variables names were changed for clarity


The attackers manually send a command to the JS or C# component to drop and execute a batch file from one of their servers. That batch file writes a malicious INF file and supplies it as a parameter to the Microsoft utility cmstp.exe, which executes a remote scriptlet specified in the INF file. This technique has been documented in the MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base as CMSTP; an example of how this technique is used may be found here. This technique has been used in the past by Cobalt, another financially motivated group. The remote scriptlet contains obfuscated JS code that drops an OCX file and executes it via regsvr32.exe


cmd.exe /C choice /C Y /N /D Y /T 2 & Del After sleeping, the Trojan will create a GUID and write it to %APPDATA%\Windows\GDI.bin. It then moves itself to %APPDATA%\Windows\WindowsImplantment.exe and sets both of these files to have the hidden and system flags to hide them from the user. With the Trojan moved its final location, it will then create a scheduled task to run a VBScript to make sure it runs persistently. This differs from the previous OopsIE variant that used a hardcoded task name for the scheduled task. This process ultimately attempts to run the Trojan every three minutes, which is important as OopsIE relies on this scheduled task as it does not include a main loop to continue its execution. After creating this scheduled task for persistence, the Trojan will begin communicating with its C2 server. The process in which the Trojan communicates with its C2 server is very similar to the previous OopsIE Trojan that we discussed in our previous blog. Also, the oops string used to signify and erroneous transmission from the C2, which gave OopsIE its name is reversed to spoo. hex(STDOUT of whoami command)> If the C2 server wishes to send a command, it will respond to the beacon above by echoing the whoami command results sent by the Trojan to the C2 in the URL. The command handler in this OopsIE variant is very similar to the previous version, as it contains the same three (1, 2 and 3) commands seen in Table 2


In october 2016 Group-IB published the report about the Cobalt group. Network penetration In all cases investigated by Group-IB, the Cobalt group used a set of spear phishing emails to gain initial access to the corporate infrastructure. However, some of the email addresses belong to employees that no longer work at the organization, which means that the Cobalt group likely uses out-of-date mailing lists. However, when there is use of a security policy that prohibits the transfer of encrypted archives, such an email message may be blocked, so the attackers would send .doc files that contain exploits for Microsoft Office (fig. For organizations that perform timely updates of their systems and adhere to strict security policies, the Cobalt group employs another method to deliver malicious code through emails with Word documents containing a malicious macro. Therefore, the Cobalt group registered domains are similar to real ones (for example, diebold.pw), and configured their email server to distribute acting as these legitimate domains (fig. Provision of the malware survivability The Cobalt group uses different methods to ensure malware survivability on corporate networks. From our experience, the Cobalt group uses a new method to provide its survivability in every attack. Additional means of circumventing anti-virus tools include the use of exploits to increase the level of rights and privileges, bypassing UAC, and injecting code into trusted processes. Conclusion After infecting one computer on an organization's network, the Cobalt group analyzes the programs used on it and search for critical servers and the computers from which they are accessed


The dropped payload is a DLL file that has been packed using the UPX packer. The unpacked sample is highly obfuscated and important API calls and strings have been encrypted using a custom encryption algorithm. Whenever in the code the malware needs to use a string, it takes the encrypted string and passes it into two functions to decrypt it


This document likely marks the first observed use of this technique by APT28. The use of DDE with PowerShell allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on a victim’s system regardless whether macros are enabled


POWERTON is a backdoor written in PowerShell; FireEye has not yet identified any publicly available toolset with a similar code base, indicating that it is likely custom-built. POWERTON is designed to support multiple persistence mechanisms, including WMI and auto-run registry key. POWERTON typically gets deployed as a later stage backdoor and is obfuscated several layers


A batch file that is used to run Bitsadmin and Rundll to download and execute the Egregor payload. A Zip file contains a binary file that is an RClone client, renamed svchost, and RClone config files (webdav, ftp and dropbox) used later for exfiltration


The screenshot above shows an abbreviated view of the in-memory PowerShell backdoor. The PowerShell backdoor has the following capabilities


The archive contains two files; the first is an executable file, while the second is a decoy PDF document. The bear’s lair . The Stage-1 downloader will download and execute a new downloader, written in C++, not so different from other Zebrocy downloaders. How the bear hunts . In this section we describe in more detail the commands performed manually by the operators through their Delphi backdoor. As we did not identify a pattern in the order which the commands are invoked, we believe the operators are executing them manually. The first set of commands gathers information about the victim’s computer and environment: The commands above are commonly executed when the operators first connect to a newly activated backdoor. Moreover, the backdoor contains a list of filenames related to credentials from software listed below (database names): The operators take care of retrieving these databases if they are present on the victim’s computer. The operators retrieve these files on the machine using the DOWNLOAD_LIST command. This command can be used when the operators are aware of the presence of interesting files on the computer. This backdoor is executed using the CMD_EXECUTE command: There are some interesting facts here. The first set of commands is the same and executed during a very short timeframe, which raises another question: is it automated


The reason for this is that most of the file comprises meaningless overlay data, since the file is an automatically generated AutoIT executable with an AutoIT3 script embedded inside. Once started, it downloads additional malware from the C2 and also uploads some basic system information, stealing, among other things, the user’s Google Chrome credentials. The backdoor also pings the C2 server at regular intervals. A good security analyst can spot this while analyzing firewall log files and thereby find out that something suspicious might be going on in the network


Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. Use the ‘at' or ‘schtask' commands to register a scheduled task to be executed in a few minutes. Use malware to upload the large list of enumerated files to the C2 server. Use downloaders or other malware to send the new list to a compromised host. Use an uploader or other malware to send the archived files to an attacker-controlled server. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity. In particular, review network access for use of mobile USB modems on corporate systems


This structure parses out executable scripts from data provided via a remote operator. In this case, the REGEX value indicates this implant will receive scripts compressed (tar files). The malware will then decompress them before executing the embedded script. Analysis indicates the WellMail implant is similar in design and structure to the WellMess implant -- and both accept and execute shell scripts from a remote operator


Narrow attacks targeted the Automotive industry among others, while the large malicious spam campaigns appear to be associated with threat actor TA505, an actor responsible for many large-scale attacks since at least 2014


We have discovered that malware dubbed WinDealer, spread by Chinese-speaking APT actor LuoYu, has an ability to perform intrusions through a man-on-the-side attack


Finally, the malware changes the password of the local users. In the files analyzed, all the passwords chosen by the actor have the same pattern: Aa153


The configuration file for Torisma is encrypted using the algorithm VEST[1] in addition to the communication sent over the C2 channel. From our research this encryption method is not commonly used anywhere, in fact it was a proposed cipher that did not become a standard to be implemented in general technologies[2


In response to historical disclosures detailing TA416 PlugX malware infection and encoding methods, the group appears to have adopted a rapid rate of development for their PlugX payloads. The group uses different legitimate PE files to initiate sideloading, as well as a variety of PlugX DLL loaders including the PotPlayer and DocCon versions noted in this publication. TA416 also uses different variants of the final PlugX payload in which the communication routines are observed to be different when closely analyzed. Additionally, the payload DAT file decryption method has evolved regularly since the beginning of 2022. Several observed decryption schemas and a sample configuration are included below with date ranges detailing the evolution of observed PlugX payloads


Usually, after infection the bot sends a ‘PING’ message, ‘SYSTEM INFO’ message and ‘ASK for COMMAND’ message, and the C2 replies with ‘ACK’ and ‘COMMAND’ messages. If additional modules were pushed by the C2, the bot sends a ‘STOLEN INFO’ message containing data stolen by the modules


The malware can use 2 different public RSA keys: one exported using the crypto api in a public blob or using the embedded in base64 in the malware. The malware will only use the second one if it cannot create the crypto context or has some problem with the crypto api functions


Pillowmint is usually installed through a malicious shim database which allows the malware to persist in the system


1) An application is bundled with virtualization software, a Linux image and additional files used to achieve persistence. 2) User downloads the application and follows attached instructions on how to install it. 3) LoudMiner is installed first, the actual VST software after. 4) LoudMiner hides itself and becomes persistent on reboot. 5) The Linux virtual machine is launched and the mining starts. 6) Scripts inside the virtual machine can contact the C&C server to update the miner (configuration and binaries


Once on the network, the attackers engaged in network reconnaissance and retrieved a list of trusted domains and a list of domain controllers with the following commands


When REvil was first discovered, it was delivered to targets via exploitation of Oracle WebLogic vulnerabilities. There are reports that the threat actors leveraged a strategic web compromise (SWC) to deliver REvil by compromising the Italian WinRAR . it website and replacing the WinRAR installation executable with an instance of the malware. The SWC resulted in the infection of unsuspecting WinRAR customers' systems. In other reports, threat actors breached at least three managed service providers (MSPs) and used the access to deploy REvil to the MSPs' customers. The diversity and complexity of delivery mechanisms employed by the REvil threat actors in a short period of time suggest a high level of sophistication


ZxShell.dll is injected in a shared SVCHOST process. The Svchost group registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost is opened and the netsvc group value data is queried to generate a name for the service


MSTIC has observed NICKEL actors using exploits against unpatched systems to compromise remote access services and appliances. Upon successful intrusion, they have used credential dumpers or stealers to obtain legitimate credentials, which they used to gain access to victim accounts. MSTIC has also observed NICKEL perform frequent and scheduled data collection and exfiltration from victim networks


DriveSlayer is digitally signed using a valid certificate and also abuses a legitimate EaseUS Partition Master driver to gain raw disk access and manipulate the disk to make the system inoperable


Like any other typical PoS malware, Pillowmint iterates a list of processes and process them two at a time. it uses the API OpenProcess() using the PROCESS_VM_READ and PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION flags to obtain a handle then reads the memory’s content via ReadProcessMemory() API two chunks at a time. Depending on the Pillowmint version, it may encrypt the stolen CC data with AES encryption algorithm + Base64. This is then written to a file named "ldb_e.log" in Windows System directory


Along with the EDRPOU numbers, the backdoor collects proxy and email settings, including usernames and passwords, from the M.E.Doc application


Kimsuky is a highly motivated threat actor targeting a number of entities in South Korea. This group has been relentlessly creating new infection chains to deliver different types of malware to their victims. Such targeted attacks can result in the leak of restricted research, unauthorized access for espionage and even destructive attacks against target organizations


Once the Bazar loader downloads its payload, the Bazar backdoor, it is decrypted using the same method as the aforementioned Team9 variant


For the investigators at NCC Group and Fox-IT these pieces of evidence supported the hypothesis of the adversary achieving credentials access by brute force, and more specifically by credential stuffing or password spraying


Once gaining the initial foothold into a container, Hildegard establishes either a tmate session or an IRC channel back to the C2. It is unclear how TeamTNT chooses and tasks between these two C2 channels, as both can serve the same purpose. At the time of writing, tmate sessions are the only way the attacker interacts with the compromised containers


After loading its configuration data, GoldMax checks the current date-time value of the compromised system against the activation date from the configuration data


Once the VBScript in XSL has been run, console commands launched by the JS code continue to be executed. Three files are copied into the folder OFFICE12 that was created in the user profile. Those files are


POSHSPY makes the most of using built-in Windows features – so-called “living off the land” – to make an especially stealthy backdoor. POSHSPY's use of WMI to both store and persist the backdoor code makes it nearly invisible to anyone not familiar with the intricacies of WMI. Its use of a PowerShell payload means that only legitimate system processes are utilized and that the malicious code execution can only be identified through enhanced logging or in memory. The backdoor's infrequent beaconing, traffic obfuscation, extensive encryption and use of geographically local, legitimate websites for command and control (C2) make identification of its network traffic difficult. Every aspect of POSHSPY is efficient and covert


The attack typically begins with an attempt – most probably via a spearphishing email – to lure the intended victim into running the malicious dropper, which is attached to the email. In order to increase the likelihood that the unsuspecting victim will actually click on it, the malicious executable masquerades as a document or spreadsheet by displaying a fake icon


From the main function, the malware invokes a function named eiht_get_update. This function attempts to read a remote file (ret.txt) from andrewka6.pythonanywhere.com that contained the address of the remote command and control server. If that failed, the malware would default to using the hard-coded (albeit encrypted) IP address 167.71.237.219. In order to gather information about the infected host, it invokes a function named: ei_get_host_info …which in turn invokes various macOS APIs such as getlogin and gethostname


It executes the other modules and collects initial information about the machine, including information about the network, locale, and the keyboard language


On February 12, 2018 at 16:45 (all times are in the organization’s local time), an email was sent to the organization advertising a job vacancy at an American global service provider. The email contained a malicious link to hxxp://mynetwork.ddns[DOT].net:880


Figure 3 outlines the architecture of Crutch version 3. It includes a backdoor that communicates with a hardcoded Dropbox account using the official HTTP API. In some variants, we noticed the presence of recovery C&C channels using either GitHub or a regular domain


Loader Trojan The payload dropped to the system by the macro is an executable that is responsible for installing and executing a dynamic link library (DLL) to the system. The loader has several coding features that make it interesting. Upon execution, the loader will decrypt the embedded payload (DLL) using a custom algorithm followed by decompressing it using the RtlDecompressBuffer API. This API is normally used for Windows drivers, but there is nothing to prevent a userland process from using it, and the parameters are documented on MSDN. The compression algorithm used is LZNT1 with maximum compression level. The payload is decrypted using a starting 10-byte XOR key of: <sample-xor-key-redacted>. The payload is in the loader at file offset: 0x19880 - 0x1F23C size of 0x59BD. The payload can be decrypted and decompressed with the following Python script


After analyzing the final payload, we determined the winner was… a Remote Administration Tool, which we have named ROKRAT. The address used in the email was 'kgf2016@yonsei.ac.kr' which is the contact email of the Korea Global Forum where the slogan in 2016 was "Peace and Unification of the Korean Peninsula". This fact gives more credit and legitimacy to the email. This file is decoded and finally an executable is launched: ROKRAT. This RAT has the added complexity that the command and control servers are legitimate websites. The malware uses Twitter and two cloud platforms, Yandex and Mediafire, apparently for both C2 communications and exfiltration platforms. Unfortunately, these platforms are difficult to block globally within organizations as their use can be viewed as legitimate in most cases. Additionally, these 3 platforms all make use of HTTPS connectivity, making it much more difficult to identify specific patterns or the usage of specific tokens


Skip to main content . We use optional cookies to improve your experience on our websites, such as through social media connections, and to display personalized advertising based on your online activity. If you reject optional cookies, only cookies necessary to provide you the services will be used. Using reg to configure the registry of remote computers limits the parameters that you can use in some operations. Check the syntax and parameters for each operation to verify that they can be used on remote computers . In this article


Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. It uses RC4 encryption and custom Base64 encoding to obfuscate HTTP traffic. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. Source: Secureworks) - xxmm downloader (also known as KVNDM) — This simple downloader's code is similar to the main xxmm payload. MSGet — This persistent downloader uses a dead-drop resolver (DDR) to download and execute another malicious payload. MSGet typically downloads encoded binaries from hard-coded URLs. DGet — This simple downloader (see Figure 4) is similar to the wget web server retrieval tool. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity


All the network parameters are stored in the sample and can be easily updated by the author. The CnC is a web server: http://camilleoconnell[.]website The network communication is performed in HTTP. The malware uses an hardcoded User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html) To register a new infected system the malware perform a POST request to /api/white_walkers/new with data on the compromised system consisting of


The SodomMain module is LookBack malware’s remote access Trojan module that can send and receive numerous commands indicative of its function as a RAT. The malware is delivered within the encoded data that is received by the SodomNormal module as part of its initial beacon response. It then runs within the SodomNormal module and uses its “send_data” function for C&C communications


Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. Source: Secureworks) - Screen Capture Tool— This tool can capture the desktop of a victim's system (see Figure 5). Figure 5. Screen Capture Tool usage. Source: Secureworks) - RarStar — This custom tool uploads RAR archives to a specified URL as POST data (see Figure 6). RarStar encodes the POST data using Base64 and a custom XOR algorithm. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. WinRAR — This tool extracts tools for lateral movement and compresses data for exfiltration. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity. Install a background monitor tool (e.g


The shellcode then creates a string that it uses to create a registry key to automatically run the final payload each time the system starts. It then opens the registry key 'Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon' and sets the value to the "Shell" subkey to the previously created string. Ultimately, the following registry key is created for persistence


We at Team Nautilus detected and analyzed the Docker Hub account hildeteamtnt, which was used by TeamTNT to store their malicious images. Also, ‘minerescape’ contained a shell script executing a Python file - minedaemon.py. Using a web service (iplogger[.]org) to transmit collected data to the attacker during the discovery process, for instance, the number of cores in the CPU, its speed, system details (using uname -a), and targeted host IP address. Logging the activity and encoding it into files (using Base64). The script sbs.sh: - Downloading 00.jpg (as /usr/bin/dns_ipv4.tar.gz) which is the file /usr/bin/bioset. Creating a child process that listens to the socket and communicates with the father using a method called ‘Named PIPE’ (also known as FIFO). The father is responsible for deciphering messages and writing it back to the child on the PIPE. Creating a child process that listens to the socket and communicates with the father using a method called ‘Named PIPE’ (also known as FIFO). - The father is responsible for deciphering messages and writing it back to the child on the PIPE. Logging the activity and encoding it into files (using Base64). - Defense Evasion: Deleting command history. Logging the activity and encoding it into files (using Base64). Defense Evasion Techniques: Removing system logs (/var/log/syslog). Deleting command history. Logging the activity and encoding it into files (using Base64). - Defense Evasion Techniques: Removing system logs (/var/log/syslog). Deleting command history. Encoding many snippets with base64 (the same snippet may be encoded multiple times). To sum it up . Over four months, TeamTNT uploaded various images, with some being used to perform attacks in the wild


In September 2017, Proofpoint researchers detailed the history and ongoing activities of an actor we track as TA505. TA505 was behind many of the Dridex campaigns that plagued organizations in 2015 and introduced Locky ransomware in 2016, bringing unprecedented scale to malicious spam distribution. Since we wrote our original TA505 profile, the actor has continued to explore the use of new malicious attachments and new payloads. In 2018, though, the scale and regularity of their campaigns decreased, while the diversity of payloads has increased. Given the importance of this actor in the email threat landscape we wanted to revisit our profile and update it with the latest activity from TA505


Remember, Downadup/Conficker spread so widely because so many computers simply did not have a simple security patch, released months before the infections ever started, applied. Weafer ). - Use a robust security software suite that has multiple layers of protection. Even patched systems are continuing to become infected with the .A and .B variants. In many instances, this is occurring because the worm is being passed on via infected removable media, such as USB thumb drives, that are essentially acting as host carriers. Need to Know) - Use caution when opening attachments and accepting file transfers. Use caution when clicking on links to Web pages. Use strong passwords


FIN6 used encoded PowerShell commands to install Cobalt Strike on compromised systems. The attacker made use of Cobalt Strike’s “psexec” lateral movement command to create a Windows service named with a random 16-character string on the target system and execute encoded PowerShell. In some cases, the encoded PowerShell commands were used to download and execute content hosted on the paste site hxxps://pastebin[.]com


At this point, the script establishes an HTTP connection to the C2 server. If the server response is comprised only of the same GUID that the malware sent, the script deletes itself. In the case of the second-stage script from Variant A, the script deletes the registry key where it is installed. In the case of Variant C, the script deletes the file from which it is running. If instead the server responds with any data other than the GUID, the second-stage script decrypts the data and saves it as a file


Since the original publication of this approach, Proofpoint researchers have observed a number of actors -- “early adopters” -- abusing this file format by embedding it inside Microsoft Word and PDF documents. While the combination of the technique with the Microsoft Word container was described in the initial research, embedding inside PDFs has not been documented and likely originated with another source


Then extract the image file "image1.jpeg" contained in the document. Find the special logo in the picture data, decode the subsequent steganographic PE data, release the randomly named .exe in the %ALLUSERSPROFILE% directory and run it


Enables remote login - Enables screen sharing - Configures remote login permissions for the user - Allows remote login to all - Enables a hidden “root” account in macOS and sets the password specified in the Trojan code


The persistence is done during the first execution of the malware using a well-known technique, the “Logon scripts”. It creates a script file registration.bat and writes several strings from the TForm1 object. The final script is


The backdoor starts by collecting basic information about the victim’s machine and calculating a 4-byte long victim identifier, based on the user-name, computer-name and the domain name of the target environment


To install Weave Scope on the server the attackers use an exposed Docker API port and create a new privileged container with a clean Ubuntu image. The container is configured to mount the file system of the container to the filesystem of the victim server, thus gaining the attackers access to all files on the server. The initial command given to the container is to download and execute several cryptominers


Watering holes - Weaponized documents exploiting the Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) method - Weaponized documents exploiting the CVE-2018-0798 vulnerability in Equation Editor - Exploitation of the CVE-2019-0604 vulnerability in Sharepoint - Supply chain attack that compromises a chat software installer, Able Desktop - Exploitation of recent vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) in Microsoft Exchange Server


This variant has exactly the same features as the previous variant: file listing, OS version getting, process killing, drive listing, execution via ShellExecuteW(), execution via named pipe, cleaning, file removal, file downloading. Here is an example of code similarities on the execution via named pipe function. On the left a sample from Bisonal 2014 and on the right Bisonal 2011


Despite the simplicity of most of their tools, the Gamaredon group also is capable of deploying some novelty, such as their Outlook VBA module. However, as it is far from stealthy, in the long run it is no match for a capable organization. The variety of tools Gamaredon has at its disposal can be very effective at fingerprinting a machine and understanding what sensitive data is available, then spreading throughout the network


The communication between the malware and the server is based on the HTTP protocol and slightly varies between the samples. Every few seconds the backdoor sends a POST request to the C&C URL. The result is encrypted and sent back to another URL on the server as the parameter of a POST request


Check for blocklisted usernames and computernames: The implant concatenates the username and computer it acquires from the infected endpoint's environment variables. This string is then checked against a list of blocklisted values to determine if the implant should continue execution or exit out. Check for blocklisted process names: The following process names are blocklisted and if found running on the system, the RAT implant will simply exit. The blocklist consists of processes belonging to Virtual Machine software (such as VMWare) and analysis tools (such as ProcessHacker etc


It also creates a unique system specific identifier that it will use during the C2 communications to send and receive messages. The system specific identifier is a 16 character string that the Trojan creates using the serial number of the C volume and the first 4 hexadecimal bytes from Environment.UserName


This document uses KernelCallbackTable as well to hijack the control flow just like our first module, the injection technique used by the shellcode also resembles the first document. The major difference in this document is that it tries to retrieve a remote HTML page and then executes it using mshta.exe. The remote HTML page is located at https[:]//markettrendingcenter[.]com/member.htm and throws a 404 Not Found which makes it difficult for us to analyze this document any further


2) Download the OpenSSL library. Instead of saving the downloaded file, QakBot measures the download speed and deletes the received file


This script is executed and is used to decode a static base64 string within the strEncode variable. Using base64 encoding the decoded binary is stored as HncModuleUpdate.exe and is then executed. This specific resource contains malicious shellcode used by the malware. These execution steps allow the launch of the new ROKRAT variant by decoding the PE binary and injecting into the cmd.exe process


In their example, the OilRig group used a malicious macro document to deliver the backdoor, which is a tactic much more commonly used by them. A closer examination revealed the obfuscation used by the OilRig group in these QUADAGENT samples were likely the result of using an open-source toolkit called Invoke-Obfuscation. Invoke-Obfuscation has proven to be highly effective at obfuscating PowerShell scripts and in this case, the adversary was able to take advantage of the tool for increased chances of evasion and as an anti-analysis tactic. Based on our telemetry, we have high confidence the email account used to launch this attack was compromised by the OilRig group, likely via credential theft. The malicious attachment was a simple PE file (SHA256: 5f001f3387ddfc0314446d0c950da2cec4c786e2374d42beb3acce6883bb4e63) with the filename <redacted> Technical Services.exe. Its sole purpose here is to install the QUADAGENT backdoor and execute it. Once the victim downloads and executes the email attachment, it runs silently with no additional decoy documents or decoy dialog boxes. The executable will drop the packaged QUADAGENT PowerShell script using the filename Office365DCOMCheck.ps1 in addition to a VBScript file with the same filename which will assist in the execution of it. Once the QUADAGENT payload has executed, it will use rdppath[.]com as the C2, first via HTTPS, then HTTP, then via DNS tunneling, each being used as a corresponding fallback channel if the former fails


From our analysis, stealing keystrokes is the main function of RunningRat; however, the DLL has code for more extensive functionality. Code is included to copy the clipboard, delete files, compress files, clear event logs, shut down the machine, and much more. However, our current analysis shows no way for such code to be executed


BackdoorDiplomacy is a group that primarily targets diplomatic organizations in the Middle East and Africa, and less frequently, telecommunication companies. Their initial attack methodology is focused on exploiting vulnerable internet-exposed applications on webservers, in order to drop and execute a webshell. Post compromise, via the webshell, BackdoorDiplomacy deploys open-source software for reconnaissance and information gathering, and favors the use of DLL search order hijacking to install its backdoor, Turian. Finally, BackdoorDiplomacy employs a separate executable to detect removable media, likely USB flash drives, and copy their contents to the main drive’s recycle bin


It will use an auto-run registry (HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run) named AdobeMX that will execute PowerShell to load the encoded executable via reflective loading (loading an executable from memory rather than from the system’s disks


Change file owner and group. This utility is used by malware to change the user ID and/or the group ID of the specified files. This can lock other users’ out of access to the file, thus hampering removal or inspection. It may also be required in order to execute a file in certain, elevated context


The iContact binary appears to be a backdoor that gathers user and locale data and engages in encrypted communications with a C2 server over TCP. Functionality includes sending and receiving files and running custom commands such as scanning a directory and deleting files


Overview of discovered Ramsay versions . Malicious documents dropping Ramsay version 1 . This attack vector consists of malicious documents exploiting CVE-2017-0199 intended to drop an older version of Ramsay. Based on the low complexity of the Ramsay agent delivered, the threat actors may be embedding this specific instance within these malicious documents for evaluation purposes. Even though affected documents will be modified, it won’t impact their integrity; each affected Word document remains fully operational after artifact appending has taken place. First, Ramsay looks for Word documents and also, in more recent versions, for PDFs and ZIP archives: Figure 13. Hex-Rays output of spreader scanning routines . It is important to notice that there is a correlation between the target drives Ramsay scans for propagation and control document retrieval. File structure changes during an infection and execution . All of the different artifacts involved in the infection stage are either within the context of the spreader or dropped previously by another Ramsay component. This information will be contained within all logged information Ramsay collects and may be leveraged by operators in order to do further lateral movement over the network in a later stage via a different channel. Some of Ramsay and Retro filename convention . Is important to highlight that among Retro’s documented techniques, it leverages malicious instances of msfte.dll, oci.dll and lame_enc.dll, and via Phantom DLL Hijacking. As previously documented, Ramsay also uses this technique in some of its versions also using msfte.dll and oci.dll. Finally, we noticed Korean language metadata within the malicious documents leveraged by Ramsay, denoting the use of Korean-based templates


When G-Data published on Turla/Uroburos back in February, several questions remained unanswered. One big unknown was the infection vector for Turla (aka Snake or Uroburos). Our analysis indicates that victims are infected via a sophisticated multi-stage attack, which begins with the Epic Turla. In time, as the attackers gain confidence, this is upgraded to more sophisticated backdoors, such as the Carbon/Cobra system. Sometimes, both backdoors are run in tandem, and used to “rescue” each other if communications are lost with one of the backdoors


Thursday, April 16, 2020 . PoetRAT: Python RAT uses COVID-19 lures to target Azerbaijan public and private sectors . News summary . - Azerbaijan government and energy sector likely targeted by an unknown actor. For exfiltration, it uses FTP, which denotes an intention to transfer large amounts of data. Afterward, it copies 7,074,638 bytes from the end of the file and writes the remaining bytes back to the disk. One, called "frown.py," is responsible for the communications with the command and control (C2). It uses TLS to encrypt the communication that occurs on port 143. For each FTP usage, the credentials are provided by the C2 server during the request. Start routine The communication between the scripts is done via a file called "Abibliophobia23" Commands and results are written into the file using a custom encryption scheme. The binary uses a file system watcher in order to generate an event each time a file is modified in one of the directories in the "Paths" variable of the configuration file. Filesystem monitoring routine Once a file is available, the Dog.exe binary exfiltrates it, using email or FTP depending on the configuration. Additional tools . During our investigation, we identified a couple of additional tools mainly in Python and compiled for Windows: - Klog.exe: A keylogger using an output file called "System32.Log. Tre.py": A script used to create the file with the files/directories tree


This is an application document that has been used to provide a decoy to the Bisonal malware. This conference has some high-ranking government and business attendees. In 2019, a Russian RTF document — судалгаа.doc (research.doc) — was used with an exploit to drop the winhelp.wll file, which contains Bisonal. Based on our research and the released paper mentioned above, the Bisonal malware is part of the Tonto Team arsenal. Tonto Team was mentioned in the media in 2017 as one of the actors who targeted South Korea, when the country announced it would deploy a Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) in response to North Korean missile tests. At this time, researchers connected the Tonto Team to China


Various scans and queries are used to find proxy settings, domain controllers, remote desktop services, Citrix services, and network shares. If the obtained valid account is already member of the domain admins group, the first lateral move in the network is usually to a domain controller where the adversary also deploys a Cobalt Strike beacon. Otherwise, a jump host or other system likely used by domain admins is found and equipped with a Cobalt Strike beacon. If the victim’s network contains other Windows domains or different network security zones, the adversary scans and finds the trust relationships and jump hosts, attempting to move into the other domains and security zones


The first of FIN7's new tools is BOOSTWRITE – an in-memory-only dropper that decrypts embedded payloads using an encryption key retrieved from a remote server at runtime. FIN7 has been observed making small changes to this malware family using multiple methods to avoid traditional antivirus detection, including a BOOSTWRITE sample where the dropper was signed by a valid Certificate Authority. One of the analyzed BOOSTWRITE variants contained two payloads: CARBANAK and RDFSNIFFER. While CARBANAK has been thoroughly analyzed and has been used maliciously by several financial attackers including FIN7, RDFSNIFFER is a newly-identified tool recovered by Mandiant investigators


TA505 has also recently used LOLbins and legitimate Windows OS processes to perform malicious activities and deliver a payload without being detected. As the entry point of an attack, it delivers a sophisticated email containing a malicious Excel or Word file


Security Intelligence . Topics . Tricks of the Trade: A Deeper Look Into TrickBot’s Machinations . TrickBot is a new banking Trojan. An Unusual Man-in-the-Browser Technique . Nowadays, most modern financial malware families are capable of injecting malicious code into ongoing browser sessions (e.g. For this purpose, and much like other advanced banking Trojans, TrickBot deploys a browser-hooking engine designed to intercept communications to and from the victim’s internet browser. With the real-time fetching trick, the malicious code injections themselves are kept securely on the attacker’s server, not in a file on the victim’s endpoint. 7) Finally, TrickBot’s financial module replaces the original response that would normally come from the bank with the C2’s response, and the injected page is displayed on the victim’s end. The actor can turn the webinjections on or off on the fly, easily modify the injections and then push an update to some or all the infected victims instantaneously. Figure 2: TrickBot’s Server Side Web-Injects — Top Level Flow. Figure 5: TrickBot and Dyre both use “sourcelink” and “sourcequery” for their communications. TrickBot passes the target URLs list to its financial module, which is injected into the browser using pipes communication. A redirection attack, in short, means that instead of injecting malicious code into the original webpage, the victim is now redirected to a new site forged by the fraudsters


No exploits were used, so the victim would have to manually execute the malware dropper, which pretends to be an Adobe Flash installer. However, our analysis confirmed that Bad Rabbit uses the EternalRomance exploit as an infection vector to spread within corporate networks


The Rundll32Call exported function begins by creating a named event named ‘RunOnce’. This event ensures that only a single instance of DDKong is executed at a given time. If this is the only instance of DDKong running at the time, the malware continues. This ensures that only a single instance of DDKong is executed at a given time. DDKong attempts to decode an embedded configuration using a single byte XOR key of 0xC3. Once decoded, the configuration contains the data shown in Figure 5 below


The formula uses a command prompt to run a PowerShell script that attempts to download and execute a second PowerShell script hosted at the URL hxxp://micrrosoft[.]net/winupdate.ps1. By default, Excel will not launch the command prompt application, but will do so with the user’s consent via the following dialog box in Figure 3


the malicious DLL installed as a Print Processor) is stored as a file on disk; the modules are stored in the registry by the installer (from the CrLnc.dat file) and are described in Table 6


More specifically, Ramsay looks for any of two given encoded Hardware Profile GUIDs. One of these GUIDs is hardcoded as shown in Figure 14, while the other is dynamically generated based on the compromised victim’s machine. If any of the subject identifiers are found, parsing for a command signature will be attempted


Then, it drops C:\Users\Public\x.vbs. Then it drops, C:\Users\Public\Natso.bat. Then, it executes `Natso.bat`, which is a "fileless" UAC bypass found by James Forshaw. If C:\Windows\Finex still doesn't exist (which means the UAC bypass failed), it will update the Nasto.bat and execute it using the code shown below. This is another UAC bypass technique based on fodhelper.exe. On our test machine, the last bypass was successful, and `C:\Windows\Finex` was successfully created. After that, the DLL deletes the dropped file and exits


To install this module, drop the entire PowerSploit folder into one of your module directories. The default PowerShell module paths are listed in the $Env:PSModulePath environment variable


As covered above, the attacker dropped two files: Chaos and Client. Chaos is the backdoor that enables the reverse-shell and Client is needed to initiate the connect-back from chaos


Turla has many names in the information security industry — it is also known as Snake, Venomous Bear, Uroburos and WhiteBear. Turla likes to use compromised web servers and hijacked satellite connections for their command and control (C2) infrastructure. In some operations, they also do not directly communicate to the C2 server. Instead, they use a compromised system inside the targeted network as a proxy, which forwards the traffic to the real C2 server. Well-known malware like Crutch or Kazuar are attributed to Turla. Lately, we have also seen research that has shown potential links between the Sunburst backdoor and Turla. Not every campaign run by Turla can clearly be attributed to them


Create processes - Write responses from the control server to a file - Send information for all drives - Write data sent by the control server to a temporary file matching the file path pattern %temp%\DWS00* - Change the time of a file as specified by the control server


Something that makes Kobalos unique is the fact that the code for running a C&C server is in Kobalos itself. Any server compromised by Kobalos can be turned into a C&C server by the operators sending a single command. As the C&C server IP addresses and ports are hardcoded into the executable, the operators can then generate new Kobalos samples that use this new C&C server


Finally, the command: system_profiler SPHardwareDataType 2>/dev/null || awk ‘/Boot ROM Version/ {split($0, line, “:”);printf(“%s”, line[2]);} checks if the machine is one of the following: “MBP”, “MBA”, “MB”, “MM”, “IM”, “MP” and “XS”. These codes represent the model of the system. For instance, “MBP” stands for MacBook Pro, “MBA” stands for MacBook Air and so on


Whenever winword makes any graphical call, the shellcode executes. This technique to hijack control flow has also been used by other sophisticated attackers such as FinFisher. Lazarus has also used other novel methods to execute shellcode such as by using the function EnumSystemLocalesA as a callback to shellcode written to executable heap


X-Session: 0"). Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to execute a wide variety of commands, including uploading and downloading files, and spawning a reverse shell. DLL side loading is often used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to spawn a reverse shell, upload or download files, and capture keystrokes. Antivirus detection for HttpBrowser is extremely low and is typically based upon heuristic signatures. DLL side loading has been used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. More information about HttpBrowser is available in Appendix B. HttpBrowser URI. Source: Dell SecureWorks) - ChinaChopper web shell — A web-based executable script (see Figure 4) that allows a threat actor to execute commands on the compromised system. ChinaChopper web shell. shown in Figure 4, are required to interact with the web shell


WINEKEY maintains persistence through reboot via the use of registry RUN keys. Searching for anomalous RUN keys enterprise-wide can help to identify systems impacted by this malware


This specific module appears to have been put together from public sources with some added functionality from the attackers. Perhaps the most interesting part here is the unusual command and control mechanism based on TCP/UDP packets, as well as the C&C hostname which fits previously known Turla activity


The domain fabianiarte.com (fabianiarte.it) was compromised to host backend server code and malicious DOTM files. This domain hosted DOTM files that were used to mimic defense contractors’ job profiles as observed in Operation North Star, but the domain also included some rudimentary backend server code that we suspect was used by the implant. According to our analysis of this cache of data this site was compromised to host code on 7/9/2020


More interesting however is it that it also contains support for windows execution via smb shares and IPC. The sample also has a Windows version of the malware embedded inside that it can install on remote windows shares and then execute as a service


One for 32-bit and the other for 64-bit, which download an updated version of the loader. The main difference between the two loops is that in case of a Windows x64 infection, there is no check of the loader’s version


It drops ransom notes at various folders in the system and opens one after it has encrypted the data and documents of the victim. As with usual ransomware, it does this to extort money from the victim in exchange for the decryption of their files


Cobalt is one of the most notorious cybercrime operations, with attacks against more than 100 banks across 40 countries attributed to the group. Morphisec Labs believes that the Cobalt Group split following the arrest of one of its top leaders in Spain in March of 2018. While Cobalt Gang 1.0 uses ThreadKit extensively, Cobalt 2.0 adds sophistication to its delivery method, borrowing some of the network infrastructures used by both APT28 (aka Fancy Bear) and MuddyWater. One of the Cobalt 2.0 Group’s latest campaigns, an attack that leads to a Cobalt Strike beacon and to JavaScript backdoor, was investigated and presented by the Talos research team. Cobalt Group Technical Details . Stage 1 - Word Macro + Whitelisting Bypass . As with many other campaigns, the victim received a document with malicious macro visual basic code. Although the code is heavily obfuscated, the entry point is easily identifiable. The VB code is executed starting from the Frame1_Layout function – this method is used much less frequently than the obvious Document_Open or the AutoOpen. Such a combination of registry manipulation was reported a year ago as part of an attack campaign executed by the Cobalt Group against Ukrainian banks. As part of the last execution step of the dll, the malicious code writes a JavaScript scriptlet into the Roaming directory and then it executes CreateProcess on the regsvr32 as described by the UserInitMprLogonScript. Organizations should expect to see much more coming from all Cobalt Group factions during the next year


Establish persistence for itself on the endpoint - Establish persistence of another component of the malware on the endpoint - Update itself on endpoint after a separate updater component downloads the update from the control server


Regularly, the service checks if a user is logged, by checking if Explorer is running. Once explorer.exe is running, the service configures the environment and executes the C2 contact module: winprint32.exe


The sample collects the user information including current processes, installed software, system language and time zone. The harvested credentials and user information are then sent back to the C2. Here are some highlights about system information stealing


Passgrabber module – collects logins and passwords from various sources: Firefox and Chrome files, Microsoft Vault storage, etc. Instead of using Mimikatz as in previous versions, the module collects passwords using its own algorithms


The attackers have employed Cobalt Strike payloads crafted to maintain persistence through reboot via a scheduled task on critical systems in victim environments. In at least once case, attackers have maintained access to a victim environment using stolen credentials to access corporate VPN infrastructure configured to require only single-factor authentication


The Cloud Atlas implants utilize a rather unusual C&C mechanism. All the malware samples we’ve seen communicate via HTTPS and WebDav with the same server “cloudme.com”, a cloud services provider. According to their website, CloudMe is owned and operated by CloudMe AB, a company based in Linköping, Sweden


These websites hosted malware that would be side-loaded with a legitimate signed executable. These tactics are becoming increasingly common by malware authors in order to evade security products and controls. Two variants of the malware employed by C0d0so0 were discovered—one that used HTTP for command and control (C2) communications, and one that used a custom network protocol over port 22


Gather all network configuration information and record to a file on disk in a folder created by the implant using the command: cmd.exe /c ipconfig/all >>"%s" & arp -a >>"%s" where %s = <file_path


The overwritten code reads the ransom note string inside the MBR and sets it to appear on the display


Consent - Details - [#IABV2SETTINGS#] - About This website uses cookies . We use cookies to personalise content and ads, to provide social media features and to analyse our traffic. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners who may combine it with other information that you’ve provided to them or that they’ve collected from your use of their services. This is beneficial for the website, in order to make valid reports on the use of their website.Expiry: PersistentType: HTMLrc::cThis cookie is used to distinguish between humans and bots. Expiry: SessionType: HTMLKaspersky Lab2Learn more about this providertest [x2]Used to detect if the visitor has accepted the marketing category in the cookie banner. This is used in context with the email marketing service Marketo.com, which allows the website to target visitors via email. Kaspersky Lab products detect the different artifacts used in this campaign with the following verdicts: Trojan.Win32.Generic, Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Upatre and Backdoor.Win32.HyperBro. Due to tools and tactics in use we attribute the campaign to LuckyMouse Chinese-speaking actor (also known as EmissaryPanda and APT27). Also the C2 domain update.iaacstudio[.]com was previously used in their campaigns. Regarding Metasploit’s shikata_ga_nai encoder – although it’s available for everyone and couldn’t be the basis for attribution, we know this encoder has been used by LuckyMouse previously. Even when we observed LuckyMouse using weaponized documents with CVE-2017-11882 (Microsoft Office Equation Editor, widely used by Chinese-speaking actors since December 2017), we can´t prove they were related to this particular attack. The main C2 used in this campaign is bbs.sonypsps[.]com, which resolved to IP-address, that belongs to the Ukrainian ISP network, held by a Mikrotik router using firmware version 6.34.4 (from March 2016) with SMBv1 on board


Similar to its dropper, the binary seeks to evade sandboxes. In addition to the previously described trick EvilBunny performs hook detection to trick environments which hook time retrieval APIs. These are NtQuerySystemTime, GetSystemTimeAsFileTime and GetTickCount. Every API is called twice to calculate a delta, while performing a sleep(1000) operation between iteration one and iteration two. This can only be the case if any of the three API’s return values is modified by a system monitoring solution, like a sandbox


Anchor and older versions of Anchor_DNS implement the exact same self deletion routine using two sets of commands to ensure that the dropper is deleted once the malware was successfully deployed


CTU analysis of one of GOLD KINGSWOOD's campaign using SpicyOmelette (DOC2018.js) exposed additional sophisticated methods to compromise targets. A valid digital certificate was used to sign the malicious script. Windows Scripting Host supports the inclusion of digital signatures, and Figure 2 shows how the signature was appended to the script


There are multiple active campaigns currently delivering Emotet. The first is a simple email with a Word document attached. This example also shows the second type of campaign, leveraging a direct URL download instead of Office documents with macros that fetch the malware. Malicious code embedded in the malicious attachment functions as a downloader for the Emotet malware. When this code is executed, PowerShell is invoked, which reaches out to the Emotet malware distribution server, downloads the malicious payload, and executes it, thus infecting the system. In the screenshot above, you can see that the script is configured with multiple URLs that can be used to download the PE32 executable associated with Emotet. The malware is overwhelmingly hosted on compromised websites. These sites are then leveraged as random hosting locations for the campaigns to leverage. The initial URL is requested with a connection keep-alive in the header. Talos has observed recent runs of Emotet checking if the compromised system's IP address is currently found on many spam-related blocklists including those hosted by SpamCop, Spamhaus, and SORBS, among others


Historically, the group has employed the use of a series of phishing origin points, abusing access first at one university and then another


After uploading these files, take advantage of the pre-built queries within BloodHound. Queries include: viewing all domain administrators; viewing users with the most local administrator rights; or viewing computers with the most administrative user access. One of these queries gives you the ability to map domain trusts, as shown in Figure 3


Recently, Falcon Intelligence observed new activity from MUSTANG PANDA, using a unique infection chain to target likely Mongolia-based victims. This newly observed activity uses a series of redirections and fileless, malicious implementations of legitimate tools to gain access to the targeted systems. Additionally, MUSTANG PANDA actors reused previously-observed legitimate domains to host files


In their advisory published on Jan. 26, 2022, CERT-UA asserted that the initial vector for the malware, dubbed WhisperGate, was either a supply-chain attack or exploitation. The first payload in this infection is responsible for the initial attempt at wiping the systems. The malware executable wipes the master boot record (MBR) and replaces it with the code responsible for displaying the ransom note. Similar to the notorious NotPetya wiper that masqueraded as ransomware during its 2017 campaign, WhisperGate is not intended to be an actual ransom attempt, since the MBR is completely overwritten and has no recovery options. This wiper also tries to destroy the C:\ partition by overwriting it with fixed data. However, most modern systems today have switched to GUID Partition Table (GPT) from MBR, which allows for larger file systems and has fewer limitations, potentially limiting some of the impacts of this executable. As a result, there were additional stages and additional payloads that could inflict more damage to end systems


This investigation allowed us to create strong ties between multiple campaigns that Lazarus has conducted, reinforcing our attribution. In this campaign the Lazarus group demonstrated its sophistication level and ability to circumvent the security measures they face during their attacks, such as network segmentation. We assess that Lazarus is a highly prolific group, conducting several campaigns using different strategies


This .NET executable, similar to many other tools used by the Gamaredon group, uses obfuscation techniques such as junk code insertion and string obfuscation. It places the resulting executable in an existing directory and creates a scheduled task that will launch it every 10 minutes. As can be seen in Figure 6, the decoded source code still has comments in it, illustrating the apparent sloppiness of Gamaredon’s operators


The attackers configured multiple C2 servers for various stages, reusing several scripts we’ve seen in previous attacks by the group. Moreover, based on the insights so far, it was possible to figure out the relationship with other Lazarus group campaigns


APT40 relies heavily on web shells for an initial foothold into an organization. Depending on placement, a web shell can provide continued access to victims' environments, re-infect victim systems, and facilitate lateral movement


Talos has uncovered documents that we assess with moderate confidence are associated with suspected persistent threat actor MuddyWater. MuddyWater has been active since at least November 2017 and has been known to primarily target entities in the Middle East. The "Blackwater.bas" macro was obfuscated using a substitution cipher whereby the characters are replaced with their corresponding integer. The clear text version of the crf.txt file closely resembled the PowerShell agent that was previously used by the MuddyWater actors when they targeted Kurdish political groups and organizations in Turkey. The actors have made some small changes, such as altering the variable names to avoid Yara detection and sending the results of the commands to the C2 in the URL instead of writing them to file. Notably, a number of the PowerShell commands used to enumerate the host appear to be derived from a GitHub projected called FruityC2. Most of the PowerShell commands would call Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and then query the following information


Among the different files dropped by the latest versions of Ramsay we find a Spreader component. This executable will attempt to scan for network shares and removable drives excluding A: and B: drives


These commands allow the threat group to gain information about the compromised computer and the network to which it belongs. Using this information, they can decide to explore further or instruct the compromised computer to download additional malware


1) Moving the (malicious) application into the /Users/user/Library/ directory 2) Executing this persisted copy, via the open command 3) Decrypting embedded strings that relate to file extensions of (likely) interest


TA505 has been responsible for many large-scale attacks since at least 2014, using malicious email campaigns to distribute various banking trojans, ransomware, RATs, and backdoors. TA505 has been focused on delivering downloaders, information stealers, and other malware — threats that can remain in affected systems if not prevented or remediated. With the group's use of email as an entry point for malicious activities, the threat has become more serious for unwitting users and organizations


The Autorun manager subsystem is responsible for tracking the way that the malicious module starts in the system and it maintains several different methods for starting automatically (shown below): LinkAutorun The subsystem searches for a LNK file in the target directory, changes the path to “cmd.exe” and the description to ‘ /q /c start “” “%s” && start “” “%s” ‘ TaskScheduler20Autorun The subsystem creates the ITaskService (works only on Windows Vista+) and uses the ITaskService interface to create a new task with a logon trigger StartupAutorun The subsystem creates a LNK file in %STARTUP% ScreenSaverAutorun The subsystem installs as a current screensaver with a hidden window HiddenTaskAutorun The subsystem creates the task ITaskScheduler (works only on pre-Vista NT). The task trigger start date is set to the creation date of the Windows directory ShellAutorun Winlogon registry [HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWinlogon] Shell=”explorer.exe


Parse the contents of a corresponding textbox within the document and convert it to a command line argument specific to the Windows architecture on the victim’s machine. Execute the command


1) Suckfly's first step was to identify a user to target so the attackers could attempt their initial breach into the e-commerce company's internal network. We don't have hard evidence of how Suckfly obtained information on the targeted user, but we did find a large open-source presence on the initial target. 2) On April 22, 2015, Suckfly exploited a vulnerability on the targeted employee's operating system (Windows) that allowed the attackers to bypass the User Account Control and install the Nidiran back door to provide access for their attack. While we know the attackers used a custom dropper to install the back door, we do not know the delivery vector. Based on the amount of open-source information available on the target, it is feasible that a spear-phishing email may have been used. We found evidence that Suckfly used hacktools to move latterly and escalate privileges. To do this the attackers used a signed credential-dumping tool to obtain the victim's account credentials. With the account credentials, the attackers were able to access the victim's account and navigate the internal corporate network as though they were the employee. 5) The attackers’ final step was to exfiltrate data off the victim’s network and onto Suckfly’s infrastructure. While we know that the attackers used the Nidiran back door to steal information about the compromised organization, we do not know if Suckfly was successful in stealing other information


In order to download the additional modules, the malware uses the BITSAdmin tool, which this group has relied on for some years to avoid detection, since this is an allowlisted tool from the Windows operating system. By the end of September 2019, we started seeing a new version of Guildma malware being distributed that used a new technique for storing downloaded payloads in NTFS Alternate Data Streams in order to conceal their presence in the system


The BITS mechanism has existed since Windows XP up to the current Windows 10 versions and was developed to create download/upload jobs, mostly to update the OS itself. The following is the command used to exfiltrate data from the victim to the C2


NV.html, tracked by Microsoft as EnvyScout, can be best described as a malicious dropper capable of de-obfuscating and writing a malicious ISO file to disk. EnvyScout is chiefly delivered to targets of NOBELIUM by way of an attachment to spear-phishing emails


In order to identify a particular mining session, a file containing the IP address of the machine and the day’s date is created by the idgenerator script and its output is sent to the C&C server by the updater.sh script


One of the access vectors most used by ACTINIUM is spear-phishing emails with malicious macro attachments that employ remote templates. Remote template injection refers to the method of causing a document to load a remote document template that contains the malicious code, in this case, macros


First, they use COM object hijacking to make the malware persistent on the system even though the custom backdoor is installed only for a few hours. Second, the hex-encoded string is the C&C used by the custom backdoor while in the Delphi backdoor the C&C is embedded in the configuration


Creates 2 objects in the AD forest Configuration partition. Updates the SPN of the computer used to include “GC” (Global Catalog) and “E3514235-4B06-11D1-AB04-00C04FC2DCD2” (AD Replication). More info on Kerberos Service Principal Names in the ADSecurity SPN section. Pushes the updates to DCs via DrsReplicaAdd and KCC


The exported procedure HandlerW , responsible for parsing the arguments, shows that it is also possible to try to impersonate an anonymous token or try to steal another’s process token just for the execution of a command


Then, it reads the dropped file with the .db3 extension, which contains position-independent code, and uses CreateThread to execute its content


The developers refer to this tool by the name Kazuar, which is a Trojan written using the Microsoft .NET Framework that offers actors complete access to compromised systems targeted by its operator. Kazuar includes a highly functional command set, which includes the ability to remotely load additional plugins to increase the Trojan’s capabilities. Also, we discovered a unique feature within Kazuar: it exposes its capabilities through an Application Programming Interface (API) to a built-in webserver


Winnti malware handles outbound communications using multiple protocols including: ICMP, HTTP, as well as custom TCP and UDP protocols. Use of these protocols is thoroughly documented in the Novetta and Kaspersky reports


Proxysvc appears to be a downloader whose primary capability is to deliver additional payloads to the endpoint without divulging the control address of the attackers. This implant is a service DLL that can also run as a standalone process


DEATHRANSOM, HELLOKITTY, and FIVEHANDS use the same code to delete volume shadow copies via WMI by performing the query select * from Win32_ShadowCopy and then deleting each instance returned by its id


In the cases where Sakula does not use a registry key for persistence, it attempts to set itself up as a service (see Table 2). It invokes itself by calling WinExec with the "net start %s" argument (without quotes), where "%s" is the service name


The threat actor launched a series of reconnaissance commands to try to obtain and enumerate information about the compromised machine, network architecture, users, and active directory enumeration


FireEye Research Labs, the intelligence behind our Mandiant Consultancy services, identified a new Internet Explorer (IE) zero-day exploit used in targeted attacks. The vulnerability affects IE6 through IE11, but the attack is targeting IE9 through IE11. Microsoft has assigned CVE-2014-1776 to the vulnerability and released security advisory to track this issue


In this wave of attacks, Emotet trojan spreads by emails that lure victims into downloading a Christmas-themed Word document, which contains a macro that executes a PowerShell script to download a malicious payload


One of the file path name combinations observed was ‘C:\ProgramData\Dacr\macrse.exe’, also configured in a Crimson “Main Client” sample and used for saving the payload received from the C2 when invoking the usbwrm command


In this case, we can see the binary installation path and local reconnaissance to determine which flavor of Linux the malware is running. This is followed by a number of Linux shell command style commands related to the malware establishing persistence


Command Number – a running index number to keep track of executed commands. If set to any number other than -1, the backdoor should proceed to execute the command, according to the Command ID. Command ID – can be one of the following commands: 101 – Shell Command: execute the Shell command attached in the {Arg1} argument. 102 – Download File: Downloads a file that can be found on the {Arg2} path on the server, and saves it on the disk with the {Arg1} name. 104 – Shell Command (duplicate): execute the Shell command attached in the {Arg1} argument. 101 – Shell Command: execute the Shell command attached in the {Arg1} argument. 102 – Download File: Downloads a file that can be found on the {Arg2} path on the server, and saves it on the disk with the {Arg1} name. 104 – Shell Command (duplicate): execute the Shell command attached in the {Arg1} argument


Also, on some infected computers we found a tool called the Winexesvc tool. The main difference is that the Winexesvc tool enables the execution of remote commands from Linux-based operating system. When the Linux binary “winexe” is run against a Windows server, the winexesvc.exe executable is created and installed as a service


CertPKIProvider.dll, tracked by Microsoft as “VaporRage” can best be described as a shellcode downloader. This version of VaporRage contains 11 export functions including eglGetConfigs, which houses the malicious functionality of the DLL


On other websites, different cloud storage solutions such as Amazon S3 or Google Drive were used to host Windows, OSX, and Android malware payloads


Conclusion The DarkHydrus group carried out an attack campaign on at least one government agency in the Middle East using malicious .iqy files. The .iqy files take advantage of Excel's willingness to download and include the contents from a remote server in a spreadsheet. DarkHydrus leveraged this obscure file format to run a command to ultimately install a PowerShell scripts to gain backdoor access to the system. The PowerShell backdoor delivered in this current attack may have been custom developed by the threat group, however, it is possible that DarkHydrus pieced together this tool by using code from legitimate open source tools


Spear phishing, including the use of probably compromised email accounts. Lure documents using CVE-2017-11882 to drop malware. Stolen code signing certificates used to sign malware. Use of bitsadmin.exe to download additional tools. Use of PowerShell to download additional tools. Using C:\Windows\Debug and C:\Perflogs as staging directories. Using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for persistence. Using Windows Shortcut files (.lnk) in the Startup folder that invoke the Windows Scripting Host (wscript.exe) to execute a Jscript backdoor for persistence. Receiving C2 instructions from user profiles created by the adversary on legitimate websites/forums such as Github and Microsoft's TechNet portal


After collecting the data in a central directory, the attackers then used either a renamed rar.exe or 7z.exe to archive the files. NICKEL also frequently used keyboard walks as a password for their archived data collections. The following are examples of RAR archiving for exfiltration


Distributing the ransomware using spear-phishing and weaponized documents - Bat-files downloading payloads from Pastebin and inject them into a process on the operating system - Compromising RDP and usage of script files and password cracking tools to distribute over the victim’s network - Compromise of Managed Service Providers and usage of their distribution software to spread the ransomware


Perhaps the most interesting part here is the unusual command and control mechanism based on TCP/UDP packets, as well as the C&C hostname which fits previously known Turla activity


The button would then lead to the download a RAR archive named Adobe_Flash_Install.rar. This archive was designed to fool the targeted user into infected themselves with a Cobalt Strike implant. Details on the contents of this file are included later in this report


Oddly, the crooks decided to use a local web server exposed to the Internet via the free ngrok service—a reverse proxy software that creates secure tunnels—to collect the stolen data


The recipient clicked the link and proceeded to download and open a malicious HTML executable file, which in turn loaded content from a C&C server via an embedded iframe. At the same time, code embedded within this file also executed a PowerShell command to download and execute a copy of chfeeds.vbe from the C&C server


In between then and now there has been a lot of rumour and debate about all aspects of this attack with many truths and mistruths being carried in public. In this attack a PDF file was used to exploit the Adobe Acrobat, Reader, and Flash Player Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2009-1862/BID35759). This PDF installed a Trojan horse which was an earlier version of the current Trojan.Hydraq. Clear all system event logs. This means the remote attacker has the ability to see in real time any user interface activity as if they were sitting right next to the user. As described in the previously posted blog (Hydraq - An Attack of Mythical Proportions), an unpatched Internet Explorer vulnerability (BID 37815) was used as one of the propagation vectors for this particular Trojan.Hydraq attack. This security hole allows remote exploitation, which means that attackers can run any malicious code of their liking on a victim’s machine by taking advantage of the vulnerability. The number of computers we have observed being attacked or have been attacked is low as borne out by our field detection statistics. The use of browsers other than Internet Explorer by an increasingly large number of people may have helped limit the “attack surface” by reducing the number of computers vulnerable to the Internet Explorer vulnerability used in this attack. Prevention & Mitigation Trojan.Hydraq has been known to be spread through specially crafted PDF files and also through malicious Web sites. Potential attack scenario: When using this vulnerability the most likely attack vector used in this case is targeted emails containing legitimate looking PDF documents sent to high level employees


It runs the ipconfig command to gather information about the machine's network adapter configuration. It sends an HTTP POST request to the URL: hxxp://zeplin.atwebpages.com/inter.php and exfiltrates the ipconfig output gathered from the machine


We identified a MacOS backdoor (detected by Trend Micro as OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D) that we believe is the latest version of a threat used by OceanLotus (a.k.a. The attackers behind OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D target MacOS computers which have the Perl programming language installed


The use of large size files to avoid detection by security solutions with hardcoded size limits for ‘efficiency’. - A fishing-with-dynamite approach to collecting initial access to victims with low-cost tooling


In their example, the OilRig group used a malicious macro document to deliver the backdoor, which is a tactic much more commonly used by them. A closer examination revealed the obfuscation used by the OilRig group in these QUADAGENT samples were likely the result of using an open-source toolkit called Invoke-Obfuscation. This tool was originally intended to aid defenders in simulating obfuscated PowerShell commands to better their defenses. Invoke-Obfuscation has proven to be highly effective at obfuscating PowerShell scripts and in this case, the adversary was able to take advantage of the tool for increased chances of evasion and as an anti-analysis tactic. Based on our telemetry, we have high confidence the email account used to launch this attack was compromised by the OilRig group, likely via credential theft. The file appears to have been compiled using a bat2exe tool, which will take batch files (.bat) and convert them to PE (.exe) files. Its sole purpose here is to install the QUADAGENT backdoor and execute it. The executable will drop the packaged QUADAGENT PowerShell script using the filename Office365DCOMCheck.ps1 in addition to a VBScript file with the same filename which will assist in the execution of it. Once the QUADAGENT payload has executed, it will use rdppath[.]com as the C2, first via HTTPS, then HTTP, then via DNS tunneling, each being used as a corresponding fallback channel if the former fails. This PE was slightly different from the other attack, being compiled using the Microsoft .NET Framework instead of being generated via a bat2exe tool and containing a decoy dialog box as shown in Figure 1


The initial infection occurs via a weaponized Microsoft Excel (XLS) document delivered via compromised legitimate websites for which the URLs are most likely shared via email. The documents use Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) Macro code which, if enabled by the victim, starts an installation process consisting of multiple components that result in the plug-in loader payload being downloaded and executed


Aria-body starts with gathering data on the victim’s machine, including: Host-name, computer-name, username, domain name, windows version, processor ~MHz, MachineGuid, 64bit or not, and public IP (using checkip.amazonaws.com


yty”, the name we use for the framework, from the PDB path string. A “bot id” consisting of computer name, user name, and volume serial number separated by dashes


Once Shellex is called, it first passes each of the items in the config buffer to their own strings. Next, it creates a mutex using the filename and checks to see if the Service key for the service name exists. If so, it opens it using service manager. If not, it first saves a copy of itself to %Program Files (x86)%/DIFXE/svchost.exe. Next, it creates the service and runs it


The wiper could be configured to use a file to overwrite the files on the disk using the ‘F’ configuration flag, as we saw images used to overwrite files in previous Shamoon attacks. This file would be stored in a resource named ‘GRANT’, but this particular wiper is not configured to use a file for overwriting so the GRANT resource does not exist. If it were configured to use a file, this sample would extract the file using the information listed in Table 5


This single hack of Volusion allows them to receive credit card data from 3,126 online shops. From the previous skimming attack on the British Airways and Newegg websites, we know that Group 6 tried to register the domains of the exfiltration server to be similar to the victims’ domains. In this case, the domain of the exfiltration server is “volusion-cdn[.]com” — very similar to the valid domain “cdn3[.]volusion[.]com” from Volusion. Both old and current skimmers are written with jQuery, serialize the stolen data, and use the jQuery.ajax function to POST data to a remote server. Although the older skimmer is much simpler compared to the current one, it didn’t encode the stolen data or store the data in sessionStorage before the exfiltration


The string is visible within the unpacked Karagany binary and is not itself encrypted. Once the payload has been AES-encrypted, it is prepended with the IV value and Base64-encoded for transmission. Figures 4 and 5 show an example decode and decryption based on sinkhole data obtained by CTU researchers of a Karagany beacon payload


After setting up persistent access, the payload checks to see if a value exists within a registry key in the HKCU hive whose name is the same as the scheduled task (ex. This registry key is empty upon the first execution of the payload. This exception invokes the exception handler containing the HTTP communication code, allowing it to run. If either attempt is successful, the C2 server will respond with the session ID and a pre-shared key in cleartext, which it will save to the previously mentioned registry key. The C2 server will provide the pre-shared key within the response data and will provide the session ID value via the Set-Cookie field within the response, specifically the string after the PHPSESSID parameter of the cookie. If both attempts fail and the payload is unable to obtain a session ID and pre-shared key via HTTP or HTTPS, it will try to use DNS tunneling. To obtain the session ID and pre-shared key, the payload will issue a query to resolve the following domain: mail


If none of the C2 servers respond and the end of the configured hosts list is reached, the modulo operation returns zero, thus host_index is equal to zero and the backdoor waits for the number of milliseconds stored in the <TimeLong> registry key. In our case, this was set to one minute. Then, it starts again and tries to reach the configured C2 servers, again host-by-host, until one response. If a connection to one of the configured C2 servers was set up successfully, the backdoor stays in the inner while loop (C2 control loop) and checks for commands every <TimeShort> number of milliseconds. C2_GetCommand_ComHandler handles the communication with the C2 server. It leverages the Windows WinHttp API similar to this Microsoft example and receives the C2 command along with its parameters. The adversaries use SSL/TLS to encrypt the C2 traffic


In the instances we have observed, the threat actor sent spear-phishing emails, luring the victims to open a malicious Microsoft Excel/Word document. The Word droppers were using standard VBA macros to download the payload. The actor tailored the decoy contents to the targeted victims, using logos and themes relevant to the targeted company or using trending topics from their region and, in one instance, even mimicking the Palestinian authority


m": mode: net or local. local - encrypt local drives only and ignore network shares. h": path to a file that contains specific hosts (names and IPs) to enumerate for shares. s": IP address that the initial register message will be sent to


FIN7 developed evasive techniques at a rapid pace. Throughout 2017, FIN7 was observed creating novel obfuscation methods, and in some cases modifying the methods on a daily basis while launching attacks targeting multiple victims. Their development of a payload obfuscation style using the Windows command interpreter's (cmd.exe) native string substitution was so unique that FireEye dubbed it "FINcoding. These methods inspired deep command line obfuscation research and the release of Daniel Bohannon's Invoke-DOSfuscation. Reference Table 2 and Table 3 for a selection of samples and their associated command line obfuscation techniques


The kill_unwanted function gets a list of running processes, compares each process with a encrypted list of “unwanted” programs. With our aforementioned breakpoint on the ei_str function, we can dump the decrypted strings, to ascertain the value of the “unwanted” programs


Charming Kitten has taken full advantage of this timing to execute its new campaign to maximum effect. Details Of The Attacks . Our examination of the acquired samples shows hackers generally use two main methods of “Sending Fake SMS” and “Sending Fake Emails” to execute their attacks. They send confirmation messages stating ‘Google Account Recovery’ to their targets; they claim these messages are sent by Google and the user must follow the link in the SMS to confirm the identity. Method #2: Fake Email . Another method used in this phishing campaign is sending fake emails with deceptive titles like “Merry Christmas, and sending note/book/photo and others”, which are usually sent by previously hacked emails. Figure 2 shows one of these phishing emails where the attackers cordially invite the target to open the link in the email’s body. For example, Figure 3 shows another fake email that was sent to the same victim a day after the initial email (Figure 2). Figure 3. A sample of fake email after sending the initial email to the target . Redirect Chain . Utilizing and weaponizing legal and credible services to hide destructive intent is one of the techniques used by hackers in some phishing campaigns. Redirection links initially help bypass the security layers in email services, and then provide the attackers more control to redirect the target to the final URL. As usual, we firmly suggest not to click on unknown links, to carefully review any URLs before entering credential information, and not to download and run unknown files on mobile, personal or work computers. It is important to note that the main cases mentioned in this report relate to the latest Charming Kitten’s phishing campaign and that this campaign has significantly intensified in recent days


The payload is a 32-bit executable file that is used to encrypt files on the victim’s system to extort a ransom